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NUISANCE, ULTRAHAZARDOUS ACTIVITIES, AND
THE ATOMIC REACTOR
MONROE H. FREEDMANt
INTRODUCTION
.
The atom stands
In the words of President Eisenhower, "
ready to become man's obedient, tireless servant, if man will only allow
it." I A new day, artificially irradiated by nuclear power, is about to
dawn.
But there is a radioactive cloud on the horizon. However real
or fanciful the hazards attending atomic reactors may be, the public
has come to equate "atomic" with "bomb." Although everyone wants
lower utility rates and the obvious financial benefits of living near a taxable utility, there will be a cautious few who would forego these advantages to avoid the concomitant risks. This latter group would
undoubtedly grow to substantial proportions if there should be even a
minor, much less a major, atomic reactor accident.
The ancient common law doctrine of nuisance and its modem
counterpart, zoning, would be among the first legal resorts to which
these people would turn. Their immediate concern, of course, would
not be recovery of damages for harm actually suffered, but avoidance
of harm through preclusion of the risk itself. Their chance of success
is the primary concern of this paper.
The analysis will fall into four parts. The first will review generally the law of nuisance; the second will consider the relationship
between nuisance and those activities designated "ultrahazardous"; the
third will deal with atomic reactors in terms of the factors determined
to be relevant in the first two sections; and the fourth will consider the
power of a state court to enjoin a reactor as a nuisance, in view of
possible preemption of the field by federal legislation and regulation.

t A.B., 1951, Harvard College; LL.B., 1954, LL.M., 1956, Harvard University;

Faculty Assistant, Harvard Law School, 1954-1956; Member, Massachusetts Bar. The
author is indebted to Associate Dean David F. Cavers and Professor Robert Keeton
of the Harvard Law School for critical comment on this article.
1. N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1955, p. 8, col. 4.
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I. The Law of Nuisance
Although the word "nuisance" is an expression of deprecation,
it is, even so, more abused than abusive. It has been reviled by Dean
Prosser as "a sort of legal garbage can" 2 and snubbed, as a word,
by the Restatement of Torts.3 Its best friends, on the other hand,
have blown it up to grotesque proportions. One authority states
that nuisance is "regarded as incapable of precise definition so as to
fit all cases," 4 but nevertheless wades helpfully in: ". . . In its
broadest sense, it is that which annoys or gives trouble or vexation, that
which is offensive or noxious; anything that works hurt, inconvenience
or damage." ' This does, of course, "fit all cases," and it is little
wonder that "nuisance" was the successfully asserted cause of action
when a cockroach was baked into a pie.6 The need for a less inclusive
definition is clearly indicated.
Nuisance dates back in English law fully eight centuries 7 with
the development of the assize of nuisance, "a criminal writ affording
incidental civil relief, designed to cover invasions of the plaintiff's
land due to conduct wholly on the land of the defendant." 8 This was
superseded by the action on the case for nuisance, limited to interference with the use or enjoyment of land.9
2. Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 T.x. L. Rrv. 399, 4110 (1942). By way
of contrast, the Supreme Court of the United States has referred to nuisance as "the
great principle of the common law, which is equally the teaching of Christian morality, so to use one's property so as not to injure others . . .," Baltimore and Potomac
R.R. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U.S. 317, 331 (1882). But cf. Holmes, writing of
"... hollow deductions from empty general propositions like sic utere tuo alienum
non laedas, which teaches nothing but a benevolent yearning. . . ." Holmes, Privilege,
Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. Rtv. 1, 3 (1894).
3. RESTATEMENT, TORTS, § 882 (1939). See scope note to c. 40. Professor Seavey
has criticized this, and it is difficult to disagree with him: "I can understand the desire to avoid a term like nuisance, but since nuisance is a word which is and will be
used by the courts, it would seem better to ascertain the way in which they use it
than to avoid its use." Seavey, Nuisance: Contributory Negligence and Other Mysteries, 65 HARV. L. Rv. 984, 985, n. 4 (1952).
"There is perhaps no more impenetrable
4. 66 C.J.S. Nuisances, § 1 (1950).
jungle in the entire law than that which surrounds the word 'nuisance.'" PROSSER,
TORTS 389 (1955). Cf. 39 AM. JUR. NUISANCES § 2 (1942).
5. 66 C.J.S. Nuisances, § 1 (1950). Compare "anything that worketh hurt, inconvenience or damage," 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *216; "anything wrongfully done or permitted which injures another in the enjoyment of his legal rights."
3 COOLEY, TORTS 398 (4ed. 1932). As Judge Kenworthey has wryly commented, "This
[Cooley's] definition could well be applied to the cause of action which arises in favor
of a husband when another alienates the affections of his wife." Kenworthey, The
Private Nuisance Concept in Pennsylvania: A Comparison with the Restatement, 54
DICK. L. Rgv. 109, 110 (1949).
6. Carroll v. New York Pie Baking Co., 215 App. Div. 240, 213 N.Y.S. 553 (2d
Dep't 1926).
7. RESTATEMENT, TORTS, scope note to c. 40 (1939).
8. PROSSER, TORTS 390 (1955).
9. Ibid.
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At the same time, the crime of nuisance was developing to
protect the public generally from interference with the use and enjoyment of public places or the use and enjoyment of property in a
substantial portion of the community. By the sixteenth century civil
liability had come to be imposed in favor of a plaintiff who could show
that he had been injured to a greater degree than the community
0
generally.'
Dean Prosser states that the best reason for barring all other
individual members of the community from private actions is that
"it relieves the defendant of the multiplicity of actions that may follow
if everyone were free to sue for the common harm." " However, the
reason appears to be less of sympathy for the defendant than of
consideration of the interests of the community as a whole. If the
injury is to the community or to its members generally, the community
might want to weigh, through its representatives, the desirability of
the offensive enterprise and the prohibitive effect upon it if heavy
damages were to be levied. A community decision not to sue on the
grounds that the activity should not be burdened by multiple damages 12
can only be effective if individual members of the public are barred
from bringing separate actions. On the other hand, it would be unfair
to any minority who might suffer specially to deny its members
separate actions. Otherwise, they would in effect be taxed at a higher
rate than other members of the community in support of an enterprise
beneficial to the community at large. At the same time, the burden
of damages on the enterprise, as well as the number of actions, are kept
3
at a minimum.'
Dean Prosser decries the inclusion of public and private nuisances
under a single classification, on the grounds that it creates confusion
and that "the two have almost nothing in common." 14 Professor
Seavey, on the other hand, has properly pointed out that the only
difference between the two subcategories is that a public nuisance is an
interference on a larger scale and is criminal, as well as being tortious
to those specially damaged.' 5 In other respects, he writes, the principles
10. PROSSER, Op.

cit. supra note 8, at 403.

11. Ibid. But cf. Smith, Private Action for Obstruction to Public Right of Pass-

age, 15 CoLum. L. REv. 1 (1915).
12. This would be, in effect, a general tax on the members of the community in
the public interest. A similar decision is made when statutory authorization of an
activity such as a railroad prevents actions by all except those who have suffered
specially. Cf. Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1913).
13. Accord, Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1913).
14. PROSSER, TORTS 391 (1955).
15. Seavey, Nuisance: Contributory Negligence and Other Mysteries, 65 HARV. L.
REv. 984 (1952). Cf. Beuscher and Morrison, Judicial Zoning through Recent Nuisance Cases, 1955 Wis. L. Rrv. 440.
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applying to one should apply to the other as well. "In either case
the interference may make the use of the affected area unpleasant or
dangerous or may prevent its utilization. In addition . . . it may
cause physical harm to persons or to chattels." 1"
Another difference of opinion among the authorities is with regard
to whether nuisance is "a field of tort liability," having "reference to
the interests invaded," 17 i.e., use and enjoyment of land, or is, as
Professor Seavey would have it, "wrongful conduct which causes such
intererence." "8 Again we are inclined to Professor Seavey's view.
As he points out, to define solely in terms of the consequences is not
consistent with customary usage of other terms in torts; defamation,
for example, is not an effect upon someone's reputation, but conduct
affecting reputation. An injunction may be concerned primarily with
the consequences, but it is the conduct, insofar as it brings them about,
that is enjoined.' 9
To emphasize the conduct as well as the consequences is essential
to sound analysis, since the heart of the concept of nuisance is the
tortiousness of the conduct-that is, the fact that the defendant, either
negligently or intentionally, has committed a harmful act. This
means, of course, that the function of the court becomes one of
balancing the social value of the defendant's conduct against the social
interest in preserving the plaintiff's free use and enjoyment of his
property.2 0 We may smile at the quaintness of expression of the
ancient holding regarding candle-making in a residential area: "Le
utility del chose excusera le noisomeness del stink," 21 but it was good
law then and remains so today.
As summarized in the Restatement of Torts, the general considerations weighed by the courts include (a) the social value which the
law attaches to the primary purpose of the conduct, (b) the suitability
of the conduct to the character of the locality, and (c) the impractica16. Seavey, supra note 15, at 985. The Restatement of Torts has no sections
dealing specifically with public nuisances, although several illustrations of public nuisances are found in the chapter on negligence. See Seavey, id. n. 4.
17. PROSSER, TORTS 391 (1955) ; RESTATEMENT, TORTS, scope note to c. 40 (1939).
18. Seavey, Nuisance: Contributory Negligence and Other Mysteries, 65 HARV.

L. Rrv. 984 (1952).

19. Cf. Elliott Nursery Co. v. Du Quesne Light Co., 281 Pa. 166, 170, 126 Ati.
"Appellant's request for an injunction restraining defendant from discharging cinders, dust, smoke, and sulphur dioxide was in effect a demand to close
down the plant, as it is physically impossible to operate a plant in which bituminous
coal is consumed without depositing some of the product of combustion upon neigh345 (1924):

boring property."

20. SEAvEY, CoGITATIONS ON TORTS 13 (1954). Antonik v. Chamberlain, 81 Ohio
App. 465, 78 N.E. 2d 752 (1947).
21. Quoted in PROSSER, TORTS 399 (1955). Apparently there is no reporter citation. Cf. SEAvvy, KEErON & THURSTON, CASES ON TORTS 604 (1950).
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bility of preventing or avoiding the invasion.' In short, "the ultimate
question in each cause is whether the challenged use is reasonable in
view of all the surrounding circumstances." 28
Two cases, both involving a similar enterprise, help to illustrate
the conscious manner in which the courts balance the social utility of
the conflicting interests. In the first,2 4 plaintiff was owner of a drive-in
movie theater and brought suit to enjoin a nearby horse-race track
from using bright lights at night that interfered with motion picture
screening. Finding on the facts presented that "neither party can claim
any greater social utility than the other," 25 the court dismissed the
complaint. In the second,2" a drive-in theater was operated near a
residential area, so that neighboring homeowners spent their nights
engulfed in sounds of mob scenes, musical extravaganza, and air and
sea battles. On balance, the "normal enjoyment of [plaintiffs']
homes" 27 was found to hold the higher social value.
The process of judicial evaluation in such cases has sometimes
been distorted, however, from a process of balancing the positive social
interests involved into one of comparing the financial loss to each party
and "balancing the injuries." 28 As was held in Evans v. Reading
Chemical & Fertilizing Co.,29 "a refusal of an injunction upon the
ground that plaintiff cannot suffer as great a loss from the continuance
of the nuisance as defendant would from its interdiction, would be as
far removed from equity as can be." 8
22. RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 828 (1939). In section 826 there is a general discussion of weighing the gravity of the harm against the utility of the enterprise.
23. Johnson v. Drysdale, 66 S.D. 436, 285 N.W. 3.01 (1939).
24. Amphitheaters, Inc. v. Portland Meadows, 184 Ore. 336, 198 P. 2d 847 (1948).
25. Id. at 362, 198 P. 2d at 858.
26. Anderson v. Guerrin Sky-Way Amusement Co., 346 Pa. 80, 29 A.2d 682
(1943).
27. 29 A.2d at 684.
28. This can properly be done only in considering the advisability of a preliminary injunction. Evans v. Reading Chemical & Fertilizing Co., 160 Pa. 209, 28 Atl.
702, 709 (1894). Cf. Hulbert v. California Portland Cement Co., 161 Cal. 239, 118
Pac. 928 (1911), denying a stay pending appeal although the loss to the defendant
far outweighed the loss to the plaintiff. Pennsylvania Lead Co.'s Appeal, 96 Pa. 116,
127 (1880): "Where justice is properly administered, rights are never measured by
their mere money value, neither are wrongs tolerated because it may be to the advantage of the powerful to impose upon the weak."
29. 160 Pa. 209, 224, 28 Atl. 702, 709 (1894).
30. Of course, if the loss suffered by the defendant is due in a significant degree
to delay on the part of the plaintiff, equity will apply laches. Sprout v. Levinson, 298
Pa. 400, 148 Atl. 511 (1930); Reid v. Ziegler, 22 Lehigh Co., L.J. 492 (Pa. C.P.
1948). But cf. Pennsylvania Lead Co.'s Appeal, 96 Pa. 116 (1880) (no laches where
plaintiff ignorant of the consequences of defendant's business until after erection).
Cf. Township of Neshannock v. Bradley, 52 Pa. D. & C. 136 (1944). Laches cannot
be raised against the sovereign when the public interest is involved. Commonwealth
v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal and Iron Co., 50 Pa. D. & C. 411 (1943). This rule
is applied in favor of a private party plaintiff where the suit vindicates a public wrong
as well as a private one. Pennsylvania R.R.
v. Sagamore Coal Co., 281 Pa. 233. It is
4
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Unfortunately, however, the Evans court distinguished an earlier
case, Richards's Appeal,3 ' on the grounds that the plaintiff's injury
there was such "as to be capable of adequate compensation at law." 82
This was in fact an expressed grounds in Richards's Appeal, but the
case is indefensible in those terms. The court there found that bituminous smoke and soot from the defendant's iron factory "materially
operates to injure the dwelling home as a dwelling," and "blackens
[plaintiff's cotton] stock and renders the fabrics less saleable." ' It
would be difficult to imagine a more appropriate case for the intercession
of equity, on grounds of inadequacy of legal remedy, than one in which
a dwelling is made less livable, or in which an industry of importance
to the community is impaired.
The proper rationale of Richards's Appeal, therefore, cannot be
that legal damages are adequate, but that the positive social value of
the manufacture of iron in the particular community in question is
of greater, or at least of equal, social value than either residential or
cotton manufacturing interests. As the court itself takes pains to
point out, equity should be reluctant to enjoin "the use of a material
necessary to the successful production of an article of such prime
necessity as good iron." " In a region in which coal mining and iron
refining are the primary industries, 5 and in view of the court's extensive consideration and rejection of alternative methods of production,86
the holding is well within the Restatement formulation summarized
37
above.
Where, in the foregoing analysis, is there room for the proposition
that nuisance and negligence are "clearly distinguishable" " or that
sometimes said that the doctrine of laches will not preclude a suit against a "continuing nuisance." This phrase is meaningless, however, since it conveys nothing either
by literal implication nor by judicial interpretation. See 66 C.J.S. Nuisances, § 119
(1950). But cf. the doctrine of "continuing trespass." PROSSI R, TORTs 63 (1955).
31. 57 Pa. 105 (1868).
32. Evans v. Reading Chemical & Fertilizing Co., 160 Pa. 209, 224, 28 Atl. 702,
709 (1894).
33. Richards's Appeal, 57 Pa. 105, 111 (1868). Note that damages here would be
inadequate because of the necessity for a multiplicity of suits into the indefinite future. Daugherty Co. v. Kittanning Mfg. Co., 178 Pa. 215, 220 (1896) (lower court
opinion).
34. 57 Pa. 105, 112 (1868). Note that this does not mean that plaintiff would not
be entitled to damages if the burden thereby imposed upon the defendant would not
be prohibitive. Although the damages would not be "adequate" in the equitable sense,
this is no reason to deny them as well as the injunction. Cf. Elliott Nursery Co. v.
DuQuesne Light Co., 281 Pa. 166, 126 Atd. 345 (1924) ; Robb v. Carnegie Bros. &
Co., Ltd., 145 Pa. 324, 22 Atl. 649 (1891).
35. One might well expect a different result on the same facts in a case arising
in Lowell, Massachusetts.
36. Richarns's Appeal, 57 Pa. 105, 112 (1868).
37. Restatement, Torts § 828 (1939).
38. 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 1 (1950).
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negligence is "not essential to the cause of action" " for nuisance? As
Professor Seavey has demonstrated,4" since reasonableness is the
touchstone of nuisance, negligence and nuisance are separable only
where intent to bring about the injury can be made out.4 1 It is therefore highly misleading to say that a case involves "not a question of
negligence but of nuisance," "42 since this implies (as is often intended)
that something less than foreseeable and undue harm will suffice.'
That such is not the case is illustrated by Broyles v. Speer," where
the plaintiff, while walking on the sidewalk, was injured when
a door was thrown open and struck her. The court held that the
maintenance of a door that opens outward over a sidewalk can be
found a nuisance only upon proof of negligent use and interference
with public travel.4 5
The distinction stressed by some authorities " between nuisance
and trespass is also misleading. Nuisance and trespass are distinct
from each other (although with considerable overlapping), but the
significant difference is not between cases of "non-trespassory" inter39. 46 C.J. Nuisances § 28 (1928).
40. Seavey, Nuisance: Contributory Negligence and Other Mysteries, 65 HaRv.
L. Rzv. 984, 985 (1952).
41. ",Negligence is not requisite to liability for a nuisance ... only where the
defendant is aware of the harmful effects created by his conduct." Seavey, Nuisance:
Contributory Negligence and Other Mysteries, 65 HARV. L. Rzv. 984, 988 (1952).
Cf. Kenworthey, The Private Nuisance Concept in Pennsylvania: A Comparison with
the Restatement, 54 DICK. L. Rv. 109, 111 (1949) : "Negligence is not necessary
where, as in the majority of cases, tortious interference is intentional."
42. Pottstown Gas Co. v. Murphy, 39 Pa. 257 (1861). A requested charge that
negligence must be shown was refused. Cf. Holden v. Lewis, 33 Del. Co. 458, 463
(Pa. C.P. 1945): "Defendant's counsel expended considerable effort to show that his
clients were not negligent . . . This should not have been done. The question of negligence was completely irrelevant. The bill charged the defendant with maintaining
a nuisance. It did not charge negligence." But cf. Tua v. Brentwood Motor Coach
Co., 371 Pa. 570 92 A.2d 209 (1952), where plaintiff was injured when a heavy metal
newsstand on the sidewalk was struck by a passing bus and thrown against her.
Although the case is clearly one of special harm from a public nuisance the action
was decided explicitly in terms of negligence. Both majority and dissenting opinions
base conclusions upon an analysis of the risk of harm as against the utility.
43. The unsoundness of the distinction between negligence and nuisance is best
demonstrated by an examination of the attempt to justify or delineate it. For example:
"Negligence has been said to be a violation of a relative duty, nuisance of an absolute duty; that is, the creation or maintenance of a nuisance is the violation of an
absolute duty, the doing of an act which is wrongful in itself, whereas negligence
is the violation of a relative duty, the failure to use the degree of care required under
the particular circumstances in connection with an act or omission which is not in
itself wrongful." 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 1 (1950). But cf. "A nuisance in many, if
not most, instances, presupposes negligence . . ." 46 C.J. Nuisances § 28 (1928), citing
McNulty v. Ludwig, 153 App. Div. 206, 213, 138 N.Y.S. 84, where the court adds,
"These torts may be, and frequently are, coexisting and practically inseparable.
44. 160 Pa. Superior Ct. 405, 51 A.2d 391 (1947).
45. Id. at 408, 51 A.2d at 393.
46. See, e.g., Kenworthey, The Private Nuisance Concept in Pennsylvania: A
Comparison with the Restatement, 54 DICK. L. Rxv. 109 (1949).
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ference with use and enjoyment, and cases in which "the actor causes
some physical thing to infringe the possession of another." "
For trespass there must be a physical invasion; in nuisance there
may or may not be. For nuisance there must be an unreasonable land
use (that is, an unreasonable use of one's own or of public land); in
trespass there may or may not be. Nuisance is most distinctive, therefore, in that it is essentially a land-use tort. It is broader than trespass
in that it embraces (1) "non-trespassory" interference with use and
enjoyment through undue risk of physical harm, and through noise,
vibration, odors, etc.; and (2) interference with use and enjoyment of
public land.4"
Nuisance, however, does not reach its outer limits, but rather it
overlaps trespass, when the interference consists of a physical invasion.
To take the contrary position would create highly artificial distinctions,
such as between the odor, the smoke, and the soot emanating from the
same smokestack. To borrow an illustration from Dean Prosser, the
flooding of plaintiff's land, which is a trespass, may deprive him of all
use and enjoyment.4 9 In such cases there is both trespass and nuisance,
and the plaintiff should be free to pursue his remedy for either."0
Trespass is, in turn, broader than nuisance in that (1) it does not
require negligence; " (2) it covers physical invasion without demonstrable damage, thereby protecting exclusive possession from prescriptive rights; and (3) it covers physical invasions of private property
where there is no related issue of defendant's conduct on his own or
public property.
Judge Kenworthey is correct, therefore, in criticizing the court
for "talking nuisance law" "2 in Forster v. Rogers Bros.," where
defendants entered plaintiff's house without permission and stored
dynamite that subsequently exploded. On the other hand, his proposition that the emission of limestone dust from a factory onto neighboring
land " should be considered trespass but not nuisance, 55 seems highly
questionable. The case is as much one involving conflicting interests
in land as is the case of interference with use and enjoyment by noises
47. Id. at 121.
48. But cf. the doctrine of trespass ab initio. Six Carpenters Case, 8 Co. Rep.
146a, 77 Eng. Rep. 695 (K.B. 1610) ; PRossxR, ToRTs 106 (1955).
49. PROSsEa, TORTS 409 (1955).
50. Ibid. Cf. RSSTAT4MXNT, TORTS, scope note to c. 40 (1939).
51. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 164 (1939).

52. Kenworthey, The Private Nuisance Concept in Pennsylvania: A Comparison
tuith the Restatement, 54 DICK. L. Rzv. 109, 121 (1949).
53. 247 Pa. 54, 93 Atl. 26 (1915).
54. Cf. Conti v. New Castle Lime & Stone Co., 94 Pa. Superior Ct. 321 (1927).
55. Kenworthey, supra note 52, at 121.
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or vibrations. The decision should rest to the same degree on issues of
social policy, expressed in terms of balancing the utility of each use in
view of all the relevant circumstances, and ultimately expressing a decision in terms of the "reasonableness" of the defendant's conduct. The
fact that such a case is nominally brought as an action in trespass for
damages should not and does not change this basic fact. 6 "It is in the
field of unreasonable use that the law of nuisance is operative." IT
Not only, therefore, is limitation of "nuisance" in preference for
"trespass" artificial, but it is in fact less adequately descriptive of the
function that the courts perform. In the same way, as we have seen,
the excessive emphasis on the nature of the interference lends itself to
confusion as to the relationship of nuisance and negligence-that is, by
clouding the fact that the core of nuisance doctrine is the reasonableness
of the conduct that produces interference with the use and enjoyment
of land.
There remains to be considered what kind and what extent of
interference with use and enjoyment is adequate to make out a prima
facie case of nuisance. At the minimum, the interference caused by
the alleged nuisance must be "more than fanciful," " and not "mere
trifling annoyances or injuries." " If the harm is "doubtful, eventual,
or contingent," equity will not interfere by injunction." However,
inconvenience and annoyance may be sufficient, and impairment to
health is not necessary," l although a court in the ultimate determination
of reasonableness will take judicial notice of the fact that air pollution
56. An excellent example of nuisance law properly applied to a case brought in
trespass is Conti v. New Castle Lime and Stone Co., 94 Pa. Super. 321 (1927). Limestone was brought onto defendant's property and pulverized. Large quantities of limestone dust were thereby thrown into the air and carried onto plaintiff's property. The
court distinguished earlier cases permitting similar injury from coal mining, on the
grounds that the latter enterprise was the most natural and beneficial development
of the land in question. Compare Robb v. Carnegie Bros. & Co., Ltd., 145 Pa. 324, 22
Atl. 649 (1891), with Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, 6 Atl. 453
(1886).
57. Johnson v. Drysdale, 66 S.D. 436, 285 N.W. 301 (1939).
58. Board of Health v. N.Y. Central R.R., 4 N.J. 293, 299, 72 A.2d 511, 514
(1950).
59. Price v. Grantz, 118 Pa. 402, 413 (1888).
60. Rhodes v. Dunbar, 57 Pa. 274, 278 (1868). "Strong objections to certain aspects of the environment, based not upon concrete physical factors but upon irrational
fears and dislikes" are inadequate to constitute nuisance. Williams, Planning Law and
Democratic Lizing, 20 LAW & CONTnMP. PROB. 317, 333 (1955).
61. Judson v. Los Angeles Suburban Gas Co., 157 Cal. 169, 106 Pac. 581 (1910).
Cf. Rhodes v. Dunbar, 57 Pa. 274 (1868). Although some of the language in this case
goes too far, at least by implication (e.g., "the fears of mankind, though they be reasonable, will not create a nuisance"), the decision at pp. 290 et seq. draws these statements into focus. Cf. Dennis v. Eckhardt, 3 Grant 390, 392 (Pa. 1862): equity will
protect ". . . the enjoyment of quiet and repose, and the comforts of home." (injunction against tin and sheet-iron workshop because of noise).
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is injurious to health. 62 On the other hand, annoyance only to one of
fastidious sensibilities is not sufficient to make out a prima facie case.63
Nor is it enough to show without more that neighboring property
values have declined," although pecuniary loss beyond that sustained
by the community as a whole may establish special damages, permitting
Yet, since equity will
an individual relief against a public nuisance.'
act where relief at law would be inadequate, the plaintiff need not
prove actual pecuniary loss. 66
Although, as a general rule, nuisance "involves an idea of continuity or recurrence," 67 the injury need not be habitual or periodical.6"
As Dean Prosser notes, the important thing is that the interference be
substantial, and duration and recurrence are only two possible indications of this. 9 It has been held, for example, that a court of equity
"will not determine that a family shall have their dwelling place made
uncomfortable to live in for twelve hours, once in two weeks, or that
they shall protect themselves by closing the home tightly and remaining
indoors for that time. It is surely no justification to a wrongdoer
that he takes away only one twenty-eighth of his neighbor's property,
comfort, or life." 71
"Nuisance" unfortified by adjectives is formidable enough. However, in addition to being public or private, or both at once, it is also
found "absolute", "qualified", "conditional", "per se", "per accidens,
"at law", and "in fact". 7 ' None of these terms is unique to this field,
each is used with varying degrees of confusion, and, like the word
nuisance itself, all will be used by the courts despite the vocal despair
of the commentators.
62. See Ladner v. Siegal, 293 Pa. 306, 142 Atl. 272 (1928). Cf. Pennsylvania Co.

v. Sun Co., 290 Pa. 404, 138 Atl. 909 (1927). Cf. Kennedy and Porter, Air Pollution
and Its Control and Abatement, 8 VAND. L. REv. 354, 384 (1955).
63. Robb v. Carnegie, 145 Pa. 324, 22 At. 649 (1891) ; Aldred's Case 9 Co. 57b,
77 Eng. Rep. 816, 817 (K.B. 1601): "Lex non javet delictorum votis."
64. Rhodes v. Dunbar, 57 Pa. 274 (1868).
65. Cf. supra p. 79; infra pp. 112-114.
66. Judson v. Los Angeles Suburban Gas Co., 157 Cal. 169, 106 Pac. 581 (1910).
But cf. Rhodes v. Dunbar, 57 Pa. 274 (1868) and note 60 supra.
67. 66 C.J.S. Nuisances § 18 (1950).
68. That the nuisance is not constant, but only when the wind is in one direction,
is immaterial. Evans v. Reading Chemical and Fertilizing Co., 160 Pa. 209, 28 Ati.
702 (1894). Ross v. Butler, 19 N.J. Eq. 294, 97 Am. Dec. 654 (1868). Cf. Price v.
Grantz, 118 Pa. 402, 11 Atl. 794 (1888), where the interference was found to be rare
and exceptional and the defendant prevailed.
69. PROSsER, TORTS 402, n. 8 (1955).
70. Ross v. Butler, 19 N.J. Eq. 294, 97 Am. Dec. 654 (1868).
71. The phrase "continuing nuisance" is also used, but, fortunately, only rarely.
See note 30 supra. "Mixed" or "united" nuisances are those in which the interference
is "both public and private in character." Comment, Real Property-The Effect of
Zoning Ordinances on the Law of Nuisance, 54 MICH. L. RlV. 266, 268 (1955).
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The absolute and qualified (or conditional) nuisances require
little analysis. Professor Seavey has given the following "free translation of the language of the courts" in distinguishing the former from
the latter: "the intentional creation of a dangerous condition (perhaps
limited to public places), as distinguished from careless acts unintentionally creating a dangerous condition or a careless failure to fulfill
a duty to repair." 72
These, then, are relatively useless adjectives in nuisance law, since
their relevance is limited to cases in which the single words for which
they substitute are more descriptive. If the interference is intentional,7"
we might just as well say so. If the interference is negligent,74 we can
as easily say that. This is equally true when the question is whether
contributory negligence will serve as a defense, or whether negligence
in the operation of an inherently risky activity must be shown. Contributory negligence, of course, is not a defense to a wilful tort; "'
and negligence or wilfulness in initiating a dangerous enterprise makes
negligence of operation irrelevant. 76
The phrases nuisance per se (or at law) and nuisance per accidens
(or in fact) can be used to better purpose, although the temptation to
cast them out as intellectual dust-collectors may at first be a strong
one. 77 Some of the classic definitions are the most misleading, if not
the most bewildering. For example, a nuisance per se has been defined
as an "act, occupation, or structure which is a nuisance at all times and
under any circumstances, regardless of location or surroundings." 78
The error in a recent law review note 71 illustrates both the inadequacy of this definition and the confusion that typifies the area. It is
72. Seavey, Nuisance: Contributory Negligence and Other Mysteries, 65 HARV.
L. REv. 984, 991 (1952). Cf. PRossxR, TORTS 400 (1955): "Usually the statement that
a nuisance is 'absolute' . . . means only that it does not arise out of negligent conduct."
73. An interference is intentional even when it occurs "in the pursuit of a laudable enterprise without any desire to cause harm," as long as the actor knows that the
interference is resulting or that it is "substantially certain" to result from his conduct.
RESTATEMXNT, TORTS § 825, comment a (1939).
74. An interference is negligent where the actor realizes or should realize that
his conduct involves a serious risk or likelihood of causing such interference. RgSTATEMtNT, TORTS

§ 825, comment a (1939).

75. Cf. McFarlane v. Niagara Falls, 247 N.Y. 340, 160 N.E. 391 (1928). Seavey,
Nuisance: Contributory Negligence and Other Mysteries, 65 HARv. L. Ryv. 894, 991
(1952). See, generally, PROsstR, TORTS 289 (1955).
76. Cf. King v. Columbian Carbon Co., 152 F.2d 636 (5th Cir. 1945); but cf.
PROSSER, TORTS 336 (1955).
77. Cf. Kenworthey, The Private Nuisance Concept in Pennsylvania: A Comparison with the Restatement, 54 DICK. L. Rzv. 109, 114 (1949): "The law of nuisance would be much more understandable if nuisance per se and in fact were forgotten."
78. 66 C.J.S. Nuisances § 3 (1950).
79. Note, Recent Change in Pennsylvania's Concept of Private Nuisance, 16 U.
or PITT. L. Ri. 384 (1955). Cf. the confusion in Comment, Real Property-The
Effect of Zoning Ordinances on the Law of Nuisance, 54 MIcH. L. REv. 266 (1955).
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there stated that the law of Pennsylvania holds a fertilizer plant to be
a nuisance per se within the definition quoted in the preceding paragraph.' In the case cited in support of this proposition, however, the
finding adopted by the court was that "The business of boiling up the
carcasses of dead animals in a thickly populated neighborhood, which
causes an offensive smell, is per se a nuisance and may be enjoined
l The important phrases, of course, are "in a thickly popu,,
lated neighborhood" and "which causes an offensive smell." Not only
is a fertilizer plant not a nuisance "regardless of location," but the
defendant will be permitted to show that the alleged offensive odors
are not substantial or that they can be controlled by more modern
methods of production.82
The usefulness of the per se classification, in nuisance as in other
areas of the law, is in designating those factual situations in which
harm will be inferred or judicially noticed upon proof of the conduct
It is, in short, a classification for purposes of allocating the
alone.'
burden of proof. The inference of harmful consequences may be
conclusive,8 4 as in the field of antitrust, 5 or it may be rebuttable by
the defendant.8 " That a fertilizer plant in a thickly populated neighborhood gives rise to a rebuttable inference of harm, was, in fact, the
precise holding in the Evans case:
The difference between a nuisance per se and [a nuisance in fact]
where a lawful business is carried on so as td become a nuisance,
is not in the remedy, but only in the proof of it.8 7

In the one

case the wrong is established by proof of the mere act; in the
other, by proof of the act and its consequences. Testimony hay80. 16 U. oP PITT. L. Rlv. 384, 388 (1955).
81. Evans v. Reading Chemical and Fertilizing Co., 160 Pa. 209, 212 28 Atl. 702,
704 (1894). Sprout v. Levinson, 298 Pa. 400, 148 Atl. 511 (1930), cited for the same
proposition, held that a gas station in a commercial zone is not a nuisance per se. In
Carney v. Penn Oil Co., 291 Pa. 371, 104 At. 133 (1928), where a gas station was
held to be a nuisance per se, it was in a residential zone.
82. Evans v. Reading Chemical and Fertilizing Co., 160 Pa. 209, 28 AtI. 702
(1894). Cf. Pennsylvania Lead Co.'s Appeal, 96 Pa. 116, 125 (1880): "... Whether
a smelting house for lead is or is not a nuisance per se to adjoining land depends
very much upon its situation."
83. Ladner v. Siegel, 293 Pa. 306, 310, 142 AtI. 272, 273 (1928). "A given business will . . .constitute a nuisance per se when it is generally known to be injurious
to health and to cause legal damage to property in certain localities and surroundings,
regardless of how it may be carried on, for the common experience of mankind, of
Cf. Dennis v.
which the courts take judicial notice, proves this to be the result.
Eckhardt, 3 Grant 390 (Pa. 1862).
84. Engle v. Scott, 57 Ariz. 383, 114 P.2d 236 (1941).
85. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
86. Evans v. Reading Chemical and Fertilizing Co., 160 Pa. 209, 28 At. 702
(1894). Cf. WIGMORS, Evidence § 453 (Student ed. 1935).
87. Judge Kenworthey has criticized this statement as it appeared in Dennis v.
Eckhardt, 3 Grant 390 (Pa. 1862). Kenworthey, The Private Nuisance Concept in
Pennsylvania: A Comparisonwith the Restatement, 54 DICK. L. REv. 109, 114 (1949).
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ing been submitted by the plaintiff to prove the act, the burden is
on the defendant to show that it . . . does not produce odors
and stenches which are offensive and disagreeable . . . and

which impairs [plaintiffs'] physical comfort, and interferes with
the enjoyment of their property
to do." 88

.

.

This the defendant failed

There are few cases in which the defendant should be denied such
an opportunity of rebuttal, if he is willing to try to carry the burden.
However, there of course comes a point at which continuation of the
offensive use, in an attempt to demonstrate reasonableness, becomes
either unduly burdensome to the court or unfair to the plaintiff.
Certainly the court's view of the likelihood, or lack of it, that the
defendant can succeed, will be an important factor in such a case. Thus
in Ladner v. Siegel,89 the court refused to appoint a master to determine
whether defendant's public garage was in fact an unreasonable use in
a residential neighborhood. In Evans v. Reading Chemical and Fertilizer Co.,9" on the other hand, the defendant was given time to try
out a new method of odor control.
The practice is similar in cases of "anticipating" the nuisance, that
is, of enjoining its erection before direct proof of harmful consequences
is possible. In a clear case the injunction will issue,9 ' but more often
the defendant will be permitted to proceed at his peril."2 This rule
should not be extended, however, to allow the defendant to proceed at
the plaintiff's peril-that is, in a case in which the defendant's failure to
operate without harming the plaintiff would result in irreparable injury.
There are a limited number of cases in which the inference of
offensive consequences should be conclusive, and the defendant will not
be heard to deny them. These should be restricted, however, to those
uses declared public nuisances by statute or determined public nuisances
because contrary to judicially discovered public policy. An example
would be a club that unlawfully sells liquor to non-members or to
minors, or "a house kept for promiscuous and noisy tippling, permitting
drunkenness,

.

.

. even though the riots and disorder are not [proved

to be] heard beyond the walls of the building." 9
88. Evans v. Reading Chemical and Fertilizing Co., 160 Pa. 209, 28 Atl. 702

(1894).
89. 293 Pa.

306, 142 Atl. 272 (1928).
90. 160 Pa. 209, 28 Atl. 702 (1894).
91. Ross v. Butler, 19 N.J. Eq. 294 (Ch. 1868). The defendant did not even deny

the alleged harmful consequences.
92. Duncan v. Hays & Greenwood, 22 N.J. Eq. 25 (Ch. 1871). These and other
New Jersey cases are discussed in Cowan, Air Pollution Control in New Jersey, 9
RUTGERS L. Rzv. 607 (1955). Cf. the question of laches, discussed in note 30 supra,
which is related to the problem of anticipation of the nuisance.
93. Commonwealth v. Italian-American Republican Club, 33 Del. Co. 313, 317
(Pa. C.P. 1943). Cf. Engle v. Scott, 57 Ariz. 383, 114 P.2d 236 (1941) (gambling
house).

TEMPLE LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 30

To summarize, a nuisance is a land-use tort consisting of conduct
on one's own or public property, that creates, in view of the interests
of the two parties and the total social context, an unreasonable interference, trespassory or non-trespassory, with another's use and enjoyment of public or private property.
II. The Relationship Between Nuisance and UltrahazardousActivities.
If there is any legal concept more confused and confusing than
nuisance generally, it is "ultrahazardous activities." Not only is the
language and reasoning employed in the cases conflicting, 94 but here
too considerable disagreement exists even among the leading commentators.
According to black letter in the Restatement, an ultrahazardous
activity is one that "(a) necessarily involves a risk of serious harm to
the person, land or chattels of others which cannot be eliminated by
the exercise of the utmost care, and (b) is not a matter of common
usage." ' In a comment, the ultrahazardous activity is distinguished
from negligence or nuisance on the grounds that the risk is justified
or made reasonable by an overriding social utility.9 8 At the same time,
it is described along with negligence as a kind of conduct that can give
rise to those consequences generally termed nuisance.97 Liability for
ultrahazardous activities is stated to be absolute or without fault."
Dean Prosser favors the Rylands v. Fletcher99 doctrine, which
he summarizes in terms of strict liability on the part of "one who
maintains a condition, or engages in an activity, which involves a
high degree of risk of harm to others and is abnormal in the community
and inappropriate to its surroundings." 100 He too conceives of this
"abnormally dangerous activity for which strict liability is imposed"
as a kind of conduct (similar in this regard to negligence) which
can give rise to consequences described as nuisance.'
He distinguishes the Restatement rule from his own formulation
of Rylands v. Fletcher in that the former ignores the relationship of
94. This is true even within a single jurisdiction. For example, in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, 6 At. 453 (1886), Rylands v. Fletcher [18681
L.R. 3 H.L. 330, was specifically disavowed as "arbitrary", whereas in Hauck v. Tidewater Pipe Line Co., 153 Pa. 366, 26 At. 644 (1893), the charge to the jury was
taken verbatim from Rylands and was affirmed. Cf. Kenworthey, The Private Nuisance Concept in Pennsylvania: A Comparison with the Restatement, 54 DICK. L.
Rtv. 109 (1949).
95. R sTATsmNT, ToRTs § 520 (1939).
96. Id., comment a.
97. RnsTATmENT, ToRTs § 822 (1939).

98. Id., § 519.
99. [18681 L.R. 3 H.L. 330.
100. PROSsER, TORTS 329 (1955).

101. Id., at 389.
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the activity to its surroundings (a broader test), but insists upon
extreme danger and the impossibility of eliminating it with all possible
care (a narrower test) .12 Also, whereas Dean Prosser adopts the
English view that foreseeable injury is not compensable if brought about
by an unforeseeable intervening cause,' the Restatement, taking a
The most inbroader view, follows the standard negligence test."
teresting difference in the way in which Dean Prosser presents his
analysis, however, lies in the fact that only twice in the section on
"Abnormal Things and Activities" does he make explicit reference to
the question of high social utility. These references occur when he
notes social utility of the activity as the grounds for opposition to the
Rylands doctrine of strict liability,0 5 and as the basis of the defense
of statutory authority.'0 8
Professor Seavey takes a quite different perspective. His entire
emphasis is on the fact that in ultrahazardous activity it is social utility
that justifies, or makes reasonable, conduct that otherwise would be
negligent. 0 7 Whereas the other two authorities see negligence and
ultrahazardous activity as conduct that may produce a consequence
called nuisance,'0 8 Professor Seavey describes nuisance as tortious
(unreasonable) conduct that is different from ultrahazardous activity
(reasonable conduct) because of the existence of negligence in the
former and its absence in the latter. As he puts it, "The line between
ultrahazardous activity and tortious conduct is crossed at the point
where the continuance of the activity is not sufficiently important to
the public welfare to permit its continuation." 109 Of course, Professor
Seavey agrees with the others, as a necessary corollary to his analysis,
that liability is imposed upon the defendant without fault." 0
None of these formulations is completely satisfactory. Nowhere
do we find adequate justification or explanation of the fact that liability
is imposed at all, or that although liability is imposed when harm
actually occurs, the potential plaintiff will be denied an injunction
against the risky conduct. If law is a prediction of what courts will
do--or even if law is something more than this, but we are momentarily being pragmatic about it-the fact that an injunction will be
102. PRosSER,

op. cit. supra note 100 at 335.

103. Id., at 340.
104. RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 510, 522 (1939).
105. PROss~m, TORTS 332 (1955).
106. Id., at 343.
107. Seavey, Nuisance: Contributory Negligence and Other Mysteries, 65 HmAv.

L. Rzv. 984, 986 (1952).
108.

RESTATZmENT,

ToRTs, scope note to c. 40 (1939) ; PROSSal, ToRTs 391(1955).

109. Seavey, supra note 107, at 986.

110. Seavey, Principles of Torts, 56 HARv. L. Rev. 72, 78, 86 (1942).
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denied but damages granted is one of the more significant and distinctive horns on our strange animal.
Undoubtedly the remedy at law is inadequate. If an explosives
factory is constructed next door to a homeowner, it is small consolation
to the latter that if there should be an explosion, he can recover the
fair value of his home and, if it should come to that, his life. Why
should the factory owner have a virtual power of eminent domain? ""
But why shouldn't he have this and more? He has done nothing
wrong. The remedy of damages at law may be inadequate to the
neighboring plaintiff, but why should a neighbor have a remedy at all?
Does the reason for granting damages but denying an injunction
derive somehow from the element stressed in Professor Seavey's
formulation, namely, the social utility of the project? Although social
utility may hold the answer, it is difficult to see why the defendant
should not be protected as well from liability for actual harm as from
an injunction. Certainly we cannot say that it was reasonable for the
defendant to have created the risk, but that he is now unreasonable
because, through no fault of his own, the risk has matured into physical
harm. Since the defendant is no more at fault than is the plaintiff
(note that the plaintiff may move within the area of risk after the
defendant has established it) 1" why should not the plaintiff bear any
loss that may result? This is not only equally just but it is consistent
with the desire to foster the dangerous but socially useful activity.
The dynamite manufacturer may be quite effectively discouraged from
engaging in his desirable trade by the threat of heavy damages or the
expense of his insurance premiums. The prospective atomic reactor
developer, at least, has found this to be a problem." 3
Perhaps, though, the answer lies in the insurance factor. Historically, at least, this is highly unlikely. If the courts since 1868 have
given primary consideration to insurance, it has been with a maximum
of foresight and a minimum of articulation. And apart from the
deterrent effect on desirable though dangerous activities, the defendant
111.

"...

To refuse equitable relief . . . and remit the plaintiff to his remedy

at law, would be, in effect, giving the wrongdoer a power . . .to take the injured
party's property for his private purposes upon making, from time to time, such compensation as the whims of a jury may give." Evans v. Reading Chemical and Fertilizer Co., 160 Pa. 209, 217, 28 Ati. 702, 706 (1894).
112. "Carrying on an offensive trade for any number of years in a place remote
from buildings and public roads does not entitle the owner to continue it in the same
place after houses have been built and roads laid out in the neighborhood, to the
occupants of which and travellers upon which it is a nuisance." Weir's Appeal, 74
Pa. 230, 241 (1873). See also, Daugherty v. Kittanning Mfg. Co., 178 Pa. 215, 85
Atl. 1111 (1896); (lower court opinion); Pennsylvania Lead Co.'s Appeal, 96 Pa.
116, 127 (1880).
113. Cf. note 197 infra.
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is not always the more appropriate party to bear the premium burden." 4
However, if the justification is social utility, is it not fair to
place the burden on the defendant and through him spread the costs
throughout the community? The strongest case for this line of reasoning is that in which a private homeowner is suing a public utility. But
what if a large manufacturer is the plaintiff and a small manufacturer
is the defendant, or if the plaintiff and defendant are both private
individuals?
Another suggestion has been that the rationale lies in "the disposition to make the harm-causing activity pay its way," on the ground
that "this serves to gauge the economic value of the activity." 115
But why should it pay its way? Why shouldn't its neighbors pay their
way? Must a comer grocery in a residential neighborhood pay its
way by reimbursing the neighbors for depreciated values? Would
not such a requirement to an equal degree serve to gauge the economic
value of the grocery as compared to the competing residential interests?
These questions suggest a line of reasoning somewhat off the main
stream of thought. The defendant who has constructed the ultrahazardous activity presumably has increased the value of his own
property in so doing. At the same time he has decreased the value of
his neighbors' land, at least to the extent of actual damage once the
risk has matured into harm. The defendant has been, in a word, enriched, and at the expense of others. Has he perhaps been unjustly
enriched, and is that in fact the rational basis for allowing recovery? "'
One of the first objections that comes to mind is that the enrichment of the defendant may be far less in a given case than is the harm
to the plaintiff or a group of plaintiffs. Yet damages are consistently
measured in terms of the plaintiff's injury. In the law of restitution,
however, one who has benefited without fault need only restore the
7
benefit received."
More basic, however, is the question of what makes the enrichment
unjust. We might say that for some reason the actual physical harm
is unjust, while the creation and maintenance of the risk itself is not
unjust. But by hypothesis the defendant's conduct has not been tortious, and it cannot become so solely because of an uncontrollable injury.
Without tortious conduct there appears to be nothing to make the
114. See Morris, Hazardous Enterprises and Risk Bearing Capacity, 61 YALx
L.J. 1172, 1178 (1952).
115. Note, Absolute Liability for Dangerous Things, 61 HARv. L. RZv. 515(1948).
116. The same line of reasoning has been pursued by Professor Robert Keeton of
the Harvard Law School in an unpublished mimeograph, Materials Concerning the
Impact of Insurance on Tort Law 24 (Harvard Law School Library 1956).

117.

RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION,

Introductory Note to c. 8, Topic 2 (1937).
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enrichment unjust. To say that the enrichment became unjust simply
because harm has actually occurred, would be inconsistent with principles of restitution, and would seem to beg the question just as much
as if we were to say that there is "fault" in the ordinary tort case
because the defendant has caused physical harm to the plaintiff without
providing him with compensation.
Is there, then, no rational basis for imposing liability for actual
harm brought about by extremely dangerous conduct, while at the
same time protecting the same conduct from injunction in appropriate
cases? I believe that there is such a basis. First let me state the rule
as I think it should be, and then I will attempt to defend it.
When a person carries on an activity that creates, in spite of careful
operation, a relatively slight but foreseeable likelihood of severe injury
to another in the use and enjoyment of land, his conduct constitutes, on
its face, a nuisance. The other party is entitled either to recover for
such physical damage as actually occurs, or he may anticipate the
physical damage by enjoining the conduct that has created the risk.
However, the defendant may justify the prima facie nuisance by
demonstrating that the social utility served by his conduct cannot
reasonably be served otherwise and is of a sufficient degree to balance
the risk created. In such a case the defendant may be said to have an
incomplete privilege, that is, a privilege that is sufficient to protect the
maintenance of the risk, but that .is not adequate to justify any physical
damage that actually results within the risk. When conduct is characterized, then, by both (a) the prima facie nuisance established by the
creation and maintenance of a slight but foreseeable likelihood of
severe injury to another in the use and enjoyment of land, and (b)
.adequate social utility to justify the granting of a privilege to maintain
the risk, such conduct is referred to as an ultrahazardous activity.
This is not really very far from what the three authorities discussed above have said. With the exception of the recognition of an
element of residual fault, 8 it departs from them primarily in emphasis
on the following: (1) that ultrahazardous activities are different from
other nuisances only in that the variable of foreseeable likelihood is
relatively slight and the variable of foreseeable injury is extremely
severe; and (2) that although damages are given, injunction will be
denied. Stressed in other formulations, but not always in the analyses
that follow them, are these aspects of ultrahazardous activities: (1)
118. That is, fault in the modern tort sense of having intentionally created foreseeable risk to society without complete justification in the social good to be achieved
thereby; or, phrased somewhat differently, in the sense of having fallen short of a
standard of care expounded for society by the courts. Cf. Becker and Huard, Tort
Liability and the Atomic Energy Industry, 44 Gno. L.J. 58, 63 (1955).
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that the danger inheres in the activity itself, regardless of careful
operation; and (2) that the social utility cannot reasonably be served
otherwise.
I believe that this statement is closer to what the courts do,
consciously or unconsciously, than any one of the other formulations
of the rule. In addition, I think that it will prove to be more helpful
in analysis of new cases, if only in making clear the fact that the
defendant is held liable not "absolutely" or "without fault," but only
upon proof at least of prima facie negligence and of harm within the
risk. As more than one commentator has pointed out, the very thought
of absolute liability has frightened many courts into rejecting the
concept of ultrahazardous activities, with resulting confusion in the
case law." 9 Yet, properly defined, an ultrahazardous activity is simply
a nuisance, liability for which is limited to harm within the risk, but
which is protected against injunction because it can be demonstrated
to be privileged by social utility. Although the language of ultrahazardous activities doctrine may be "strict liability," the practice of
the courts in applying the doctrine is confined to cases of harm within
I2 0
a foreseeable risk.
It is extremely important, however, to bear in mind exactly what
the risk is to which we are referring. By hypothesis the activity is
such that the-risk is inherent regardless of care in operation. In Green
v. General Petroleum Corp.,'2 ' for example, the defendant was held
liable, in spite of careful operation of an oil drill, when a "blow out"
caused damage to neighborhood property. The court held that in
engaging in the operation, defendant acted with knowledge that such
harm could result.
Similarly in Rhodes v. Dunbar122 the court made clear that the
maintenance of an activity that is inherently dangerous may constitute
a nuisance. The holding of the case was that a planing-mill, although
119. Note, Absolute Liability for Dangerous Things, 61 HARv. L. Rzv. 515, 516

(1948) ; PROSSR, ToRTs 332 (1955).
120. For example, in Madsen v. East Jordan Irrigation Co., 101 Utah 552, 125
P.2d 794 (1942), the damage was held to be outside the risk when the defendant's
blasting operation frightened plaintiff's mink into killing their young. This is one
of several such cases of "strict liability" cited with approval by Dean Prosser. PROSsea, TORTS 340 (1955).
121. 205 Cal. 328, 270 Pac. 952 (1928). Cf. King v. Columbian Carbon Co., 152

F.2d 636, 638-39 (5th Cir. 1945) : "The existence of a nuisance does not always depend upon the degree of care used but upon the degree of danger or damage existing
even with the best of care . . . The sole question presented by this appeal is whether
or not a landowner is without recourse for damages caused to his land by the nonnegligent, purposeful, and permanent operation of a lawful business which operation
the owners knew when their plant was being constructed would continually damage
the land of [another]." Dean Prosser cites this case as one in which "strict liability"
is created via ordinary nuisance doctrine. PROSSMR, ToRTs 336, 337, n. 86 (1955).
122. 57 Pa. 274 (1868).
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subject to fires, "does not necessarily affect health, comfort or the
ordinary uses and enjoyment of property in the neighborhood." 28
The court added, however, that the holding should not be considered as
grounds for the inference that a powder magazine, depot of nitroglycerine, or other like explosive materials "might not possibly be
enjoined even if not prohibited, as they usually are, by ordinance or
law." 124 Such activities, stated the court, may be enjoined as nuisances
because of the likelihood of explosion by contact with the slightest
spark of fire, and because of "the utter impossibility to guard against
the consequences, or set bounds to the injury which, being instantaneous, extends alike to property and person within its reach." " The
conduct that is negligent on its face, therefore, is not the manner in
which the activity is carried on, but the very creation and maintenance
of the inherently dangerous enterprise.' 28
A failure to appreciate this fact may account for a good deal of
the confusion regarding "strict liability." We can say that the defendant is held liable without fault only if we arbitrarily restrict our consideration of his conduct to his careful operation of the activity, and
ignore the fact that he is initially responsible for creating the risk
within which the harm occurred.
By way of analogy, if a person reacts instinctively in an emergency,
he will not be held liable for harm resulting to another, even though it
later appears that his reaction was not the wisest choice. 7 However123. Id., at 290.
124. 57 Pa. 274, 290 (1868).
125. Ibid.
126. Smith, Liability for Substantial Physical Damage to Land by Blasting-The
Rule of the Future, 33 HA.v. L.Rev. 542, 667 (1920). The recognition of the fact that
the ultrahazardous activity is simply another case of liability for negligence and not
strict liability, helps to settle the apparent disagreement between Dean Prosser and the
Restatement of Torts as to whether harm within a foreseeable consequence of the risk
is compensable when it in fact comes about through an unforeseeable intervening cause.
As noted above, the former takes the position that the defendant should be absolved in
such a case, for example when the dynamite factory is touched off by lightning. PROSsm, TORTS 340 (1955).
The Restatement, on the other hand, adopts the usual negligence rule. RgsTATnMENT, TORTS §§ 510, 522. (1930) See Johnson v. Kosmos Portland Cement Co., 64
F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1933). The intervening cause was a lightning bolt, which exploded
gas carelessly left by the defendant to collect in a barge. The defendant was held
liable for neglegence. Note the close relationship this case bears to nuisance and
ultrahazardous activities. Note too that even those who assert that ultrahazardous
activities carry "strict liability" nevertheless apply a standard of foreseeabilitytraditionally a negligence standard, and somewhat contradictory of absolute liability.
If the view suggested in this article is accepted as the correct one, it seems clear that
the same rule should apply to an ultrahazardous activity as to any other case of
negligence. Indeed, the only reason suggested by Dean Prosser for the contrary view
is the assumed premise that "strict liability is in question." PROSSIM, TORTS 340 (1955).
127. Casey v. Sicihano, 310 Pa. 238 (1933) ; Montgomery v. Philadelphia, 270 Pa.
346 (1921) ; Donahue v. Kelly, 181 Pa. 93 (1897), citing Scott v. Shepherd, 2 Blackstone 892, 1 Sm. Lead. Cases (9 ed.) 737 (the famous "squib case"); Whicher v.
Phinney, 124 F.2d 929 (lst Cir., 1942).
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and this is as important as it is obvious-he cannot benefit from this
28
rule if his own negligence helped to create the risk in the first instance .
If, for example, A drives his car so close to B's car in front of him
that there is a foreseeable risk that A will not be able to avoid an accident if B's car stops short, A cannot rely upon the emergency doctrine
when his instinctive swerving to the right causes him to hit C. 129
The reason is not that he was negligent in his instictive reaction to the
other driver's stopping short, but that he was negligent in driving too
close in the first place, thereby creating a risky situation, within which
the harm occurred.
Certainly we would not say in such a case that the driver is held
strictly liable. On the contrary, he is held liable for negligence. In
the same sense, the manufacturer who builds a dynamite factory in a
crowded city is held liable in negligence for harm caused by an explosion, in spite of his careful conduct in the operation of the factory.
He knows, or should know, of the serious risk that he has created to
others in building the factory and carrying on the manufacture of
dynamite. Therein, at least prima facie, lies the wrongful conduct,
and therein is found the basis of his liability for harm within the risk
he has created.
We reach the question of whether the activity is to be justified
by its social utility only after we have taken the initial step of finding
the prima facie tort. This is common practice in the law of negligence.'8 0 For example, in the Palsgraf case Justice Cardozo stated
that to "make out a cause of action" in negligence the plaintiff must
show, in addition to harm to himself, "that the act as to him had
possibilities of danger so many and apparent as to entitle him to be
,"''
protected against the doing of it .
This "cause of action" or prima facie case may of course be
rebutted, in one case by the defense of statutory authorization, 3 2 in
another by the defense of sudden peril " and in the case of ultrahazardous activities by the defense of social utility. In any case such
a defense is, for purposes of analysis, a second step, even though a
court in verbalizing its mental processes, may jump to an obvious
conclusion, making two steps appear to be one.
128. See note 127 supra.
129. See note 127 supra.
130. Compare the law of defamation, where the plaintiff makes a prima facie case
by showing publication of a defamatory statement. PRossR, ToRTs 606 (1955).
131. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
132. Leisy v. Northern Pacific R.R., 230 Minn.61, 40 N.W. 2d 626 (1950).
133. See note 127 supra.
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Dean Prosser, in fact, devotes a subsection of his analysis of
strict liability to certain privileges that serve as defenses. 13 4 Included
are the privileges of public duty and of statutory authorization, 135
which, he says, "amounts at least to a declaration that the [ultrahazardous] acts are not anti-social, but desirable for the benefit of the
community." 136 This is an interesting analysis in two respects. First,
is it not significant that public duty bears upon fault? ' If liability
is really absolute, why should it matter that there is a public duty? 18
On the other hand, if liability is indeed founded upon negligence, the
fact that the defendant acted upon the sovereign's command has a
conclusive bearing upon any alleged fault in undertaking the activity.
As for the "declaration that the acts are

.

.

.

desirable for the

benefit of the community," this is exactly what the court has already
decided in the process of concluding that the activity is, in the technical
sense, ultrahazardous. Since the privilege of statutory authorization
is a broader defense, protecting against damages as well as injunction,
it must have some other and greater significance. It does, in that
"the courts have interpreted the statute as condoning the consequences
in advance .

.

."

"

Nor could a court very well say that that

which the legislature had authorized the defendant to do is not what a
reasonable man would do 14o-not unless the court were disposed to
invalidate the statute itself on due process grounds. To allow damages
would reflect upon the reasonableness of the statute. Consistent with
this view, the courts will, regardless of statutory authorization, grant
damages for negligence committed in carrying out the authorized
activity. 4'
Dean Prosser's test that an ultrahazardous activity must be
"abnormal in the community" " and the Restatement test that it not
be "a matter of common usage," ' are also relevant to the question of
134. PROSStR, TORTs 343 (1955).
135. These are also defenses to other nuisances, of course. 39 AM. JuR., Nuisances
§203 (1942).
136. PROSsER, ToRTs 343 (1955).

137. Cf., "Here the defendant is not a volunteer: he executes a duty imposed upon
him by the legislature, which he is bound to execute." Sutton v.Clarke, 6 Taunt. 28,
quoted in Transportation Co. v.Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 644 (1878).
138. It might be argued that the public duty privilege is not inconsistent with the
concept of liability without fault, since it is directed simply at protecting the actor from
being placed between the devil and the deep blue sea-the choice between penalty for
violation of duty or suffering strict liability. But is this not just another way of saying
that a person who is compelled to act has not been at fault and therefore should not be
held liable?
139. PRossER, TORTs 343 (1955).

140. Dean Prosser, in his discussion of negligence, agrees. Id., at 164.
141. PRossER, ToRTs 344 (1955).

142. Id., at 329.
143. RESTATEMENT,TORTS §§ 519, 520 (1939).
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negligence. Both of these criteria can be considered to be minimal
requirements in making out a prima facie case of negligence, especially
when we recall that the reasonable man "represents a community ideal
of reasonable behavior." 144 As Dean Prosser says in his section on
application of the standard of reasonable conduct in negligence cases,
"If the actor does only what everyone else has done, there is at least
an inference that he is conforming to the community's idea of reasonable behavior." ' Here then is still another traditional negligence test
that is unconsciously, and therefore somewhat roughly, worked into the
"strict liability" formulation of ultrahazardous activities. 46
The formulation of the rule suggested here maintains logic where
other formulations break down.' 47 Why should the manufacturer be
held liable for actual harm within the risk? As we have seen, as long
as his action is viewed as reasonable from start to finish, there is no
rationale for the result. We might just as reasonably require the
injured plaintiff-who may be much wealthier and using his wealth in
a much less beneficial fashion-to pay his own way. When we recognize,
however, that the defendant's conduct has at least created the basis
for a strong inference of negligence, our analytical perspective changes.
The issue then is, How much of a shield is the element of social utility?
Or, How much of a shield can fairly be permitted in favor of a prima
facie wrongdoer against his innocent victim?
Put in this light, the problem can be seen as one of weighing the
equities of the three parties involved, the ultrahazardous actor, his
144. PROSSER, TORTS 124 (1955). The non-natural use test of Rylands is similarly
related to reasonableness. To mine coal on coal land in a mining community is
"natural" and therefore reasonable. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126,
6 Atl. 453 (1886). But to construct and maintain coke ovens in a farm area is "nonnatural" and therefore unreasonable. Robb v. Carnegie Bros. & Co., Ltd., 145 Pa. 324,
22 Atl. 649 (1891).
145. PROSSER, op. cit. supra at 135. This explains, of course, why automobile driving is not considered ultrahazardous. Consider also the legislative recognition of "safe"
standards of operation.
146. It is true that even as a minimal standard of negligence, the abnormal-in-thecommunity test is inadequate. Probably the vast majority of eccentric activities are
non-negligent. But the test is equally inadequate for the only reasonable strict-liability
justification that has been suggested: "The reason would appear to be that if the
activity is one carried on by a large portion of persons in the community, the incidence
of harm and the incidence of responsibility are so nearly coextensive that nothing would
be gained by imposing strict liability. Unless there is a special danger created by a small
segment at the expense of the general public, absolute liability would merely substitute
a risk of liability for a risk of loss. This interpretation of the common usage test is
borne out by the ordinary refusal to apply absolute liability in cases of accidents
involving automobiles or household plumbing." Note, Absolute Liability for Dangerous
Things, 61 HARV. L. REv. 515, 520 (1948). As the phrase "carried on by a large portion of persons in the community" indicates, the criterion of "abnormal in the community" is equally inappropriate to strict liability. If any number significantly less than
half the total members of the community engage in the activity, there is no general
substitution of a risk of liability for a risk of loss, yet the activity would not necessarily
be considered "abnormal".
147. See pp. 91-94 supra.
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If there is substantial social

utility in the activity, the highest equity is in the public, of which the
plaintiff is one, in having the activity carried on. For this reason the
defendant is at least protected from injunction-not for his own sake,
but for society's. However, as to the equities between the other two
parties, the risk-creating defendant and the innocent plaintiff, it is the
defendant whose equity is considered subordinate. 4 ' Therefore, he
is called upon to compensate the plaintiff for actual harm within the
foreseeable risk to which he has subjected the plaintiff.
The balancing of equities among the general public, the injured
plaintiff, and the prima facie tortious defendant is, of course, a
common one for the courts. In other nuisance cases the same procedure often produces the same result, i.e., the denial of an injunction
(and even of some of the damages) but nevertheless a granting of
damages. For example, in Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 49
the Supreme Court held that to grant damages generally (and, a fortiori,
injunction) to abutters of the railroad might put the company out of
business, contrary to the public interest. "But the doctrine [of general
immunity on the part of railroads from actions for damages], being
founded upon necessity, is limited accordingly." '50 The plaintiff was
therefore allowed to recover for that part of his injury that was peculiar
to his property alone. Compare Antonik v. Chamberlain,'' where
the court weighed the relevant factors in the light of the fact that the
"life and death of a legitimate and necessary business" was at stake.
There is, in the Restatement of Torts, support for the analysis
of ultrahazardous activities in terms of a privilege that is effective to
overcome an injunction but ineffective to prevent damages. In a scope
note on nuisance, the reasoning underlying this notion of partial or
incomplete privilege is clearly set forth:
Even where there is present harm, it is one thing to say that a
defendant should pay damages for the harm his factory is causing,
but it is a different thing to say that he must close his factory if
the harm cannot be stopped. For the purpose of determining
liability for damages for private nuisance, conduct may be regarded
as unreasonable even though its utility is great and the amount of
148. There is, of course, a parallel to this in other cases of nuisance. Robb v.
Carnegie Bros. & Co. Ltd., 145 Pa. 324, 22 Atl. 649 (1891), In Elliott Nursery Co. v.
Duquesne Light Co., 281 Pa. 166, 126 Atl. 345 (1924), deposits from the defendant's
power plant smokestacks were destroying an extensive nursery. The court denied the
requested injunction on the ground that the defendant supplied power to an entire
metropolitan community. But there is considerable dicta suggesting the propriety of
damages at law.
149. 233 U.S. 546 (1913).
150. Id., at 555.
151. 81 Ohio App. 465, 78 N.E. 2d 752 (1947).
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harm is relatively small. But for the purpose of determining
whether the same conduct should be enjoined, additional factors
must be considered. 52
The concept of "incomplete privilege" was first verbalized and
analyzed by Professor Bohlen in his illuminating article '3 dealing
with Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Company.5 4 There the
defendant's steamship was moored to the plaintiff's dock to unload,
when an unexpected northeast storm developed. By the time the
defendant had finished unloading, the wind was at fifty miles per hour
and rising. The master of the ship "prudently and advisedly" remained
moored to the dock, although there was a clear risk that damage to the
dock would result.
At least three positions could have been taken in such a case:
first, that the defendant was negligent and that the plaintiff not only
is entitled to damages but could have used reasonable self-help to cast
off the defendant's vessel during the storm; second, that the defendant
did nothing tortious-since he acted from necessity and therefore
without fault-and that therefore the plaintiff could have no redress
against the defendant of any sort; third, that since the defendant
knowingly subjected plaintiff's property to risk of harm, he is prima
facie a wrongdoer; that defendant, however, had been privileged
because of the circumstances to remain at the dock in spite of the risk
to plaintiff; but that the plaintiff must nevertheless respond in damages
for harm actually occurring within the risk. The Vincent court, in a
decision that has received general approval,' took the third view.
The court referred by analogy to the Depue case,' 56 also a Minnesota case, in which the plaintiff had been expelled from the defendant's
152. RESTATEMENT, ToRTs, scope note to c. 40 (1939). Note that there is "present
harm" to which the plaintiff is subjected simply by force of the existence of an
unmatured risk of physical harm. If the defendant is a bad man and the plaintiff is a
good man, should not the defendant compensate the plaintiff for this harm as well as
for harm from a matured risk? The answer is that he should and he does in the most
appropriate way. If one's property is made less valuable by a natural hazard, such as
flood tides, one attempts to restore this value by insurance. However, if the person
whose property is subjected to such a risk restores the value out of his own pocket,
the property value is depreciated at least to the extent of the premiums. In the ultrahazardous activity case, the actor is, as he is frequently called, the insurer of those
within the risk. Cf. Exner v. Sherman Power Construction Company, 54 F. 2d 510,
514 (2d Cir. 1931). By guaranteeing indemnity to other property owners, the actor
thereby provides immediate compensation for the immediate harm; that is, he saves his
neighbors the insurance premiums that would otherwise represent to them a depreciating burden on the value of their land.
153. Bohlen, Incomplete Privilege to Inflict Intentional Invasions of Interests of
Property and Personality, 39 HARV. L.Rev. 307 (1926).
154. 109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910).
155. See e.g., RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 197, illustration 2 (1934); PROSSMa, TORTS
97 (1955).
156. Depue v. Flatau, 100 Minn. 299, 111 N.W. 1 (1907).
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premises although he had been too ill to travel. The defendant was
held liable in damages, but, as the court points out, if he had furnished
the plaintiff with proper accomodations and medical attendance, the
defendant could have recovered reasonable value. 157
The court in Vincent also relied upon the Vermont case of Ploof
v. Putnam,'5" where the owner of a dock was held liable for harm
resulting when he unmoored plaintiff's vessel, which had sought refuge
there in a storm. Again the Minnesota court stated that the vessel
owner would have been liable for actual harm to the dock.
We have in these cases, therefore, a direct analogy8i'

to the ultra-

hazardous activities cases. In both situations a person is permitted
to create a significant risk to the property of another. Although this
action in itself is recognized as prima facie tortious, 16° the endangered
property owner is not permitted to abate the risk-creating activity
because the risk is created in the name of an interest valued by society.
However, in recognition of the fact that the social utility is fully
served by protection of the activity from abatement, the privilege extends only that far. In a sense, in serving its function of allowing
157. The Depue analogy is especially interesting because it suggests restitution as a
possible rationale of the Vincent decision. This has also been noted by Professor Robert
Keeton in an unpublished mimeograph Materials Concerning the Impact of Insurance on
Tort Law 24 (Harvard Law School library 1956).

158. 81 Vt. 471, 71 Atl. 188 (1908).
159. Another analogy that comes to mind is the so-called conditional privilege. In
the area of defamation, for example, the plaintiff makes a prima facie case by showing
publication of a defamatory statement. PROSSER, ToRTs 606 (1955). However, it is said
that "the immunity is forfeited if the defendant steps outside the scope of the privilege
or abuses the occasion." Id., at 625.
It is apparent that what is really meant is that there is a defense of privilege to
an action for defamation, but that the privilege does not extend to every aspect of prima
facie defamation. A's privilege to tell B (C's prospective employer) something otherwise defamatory about C is not "forfeited" when A tells D, who is only a mutual
acquaintance. The privilege simply never extended to D. Similarly, the privilege to
publish to C's prospective employer that which would otherwise be defamatory is not
"forfeited" if A is motivated primarily by malice. The privilege in fact never extended
to malicious publication.
It would seem, therefore, that the analogy is less than perfect. The so-called
conditional privilege is just like any other privilege. If the defendant has it, he is not
liable for damages, nor can he be enjoined from publication. If he does not have it, he
is liable to an injunction as well as in damages. The conditional privilege is, therefore,
different from the privilege to carry on ultrahazardous activities, free from injunction
but subject to liability for damages.
160. The court found the defendant guilty of a wrongful act in that he ".
deliberately and by [his] direct efforts held [the ship] in such a position that the
damage to the dock resulted. . .". Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co., 109 Minn.
456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910). It is interesting to note that the dissent in the Vincent
case makes the same oversimplification of the question of fault as do most of the
commentators on ultrahazardous activities. "The master could not, in the exercise of
due care, have left that position. . . . If the master was in the exercise of due care,
he was not at fault." Compare Professor Seavey's proposition that since the ultrahazardous activity is justified by social utility, the conduct is not unreasonable and
there is no fault. Seavey, Nuisance: Contributory Negligence and Other Mysteries, 65
HARv. L.Rev. 984, 986 (1952). Both overlook the fact that there is an element of fault
that is justified only insofar as this is necessary to the protection of the dominant
social interest.
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the dangerous but desirable conduct to continue, the privilege exhausts
itself. What is then left is the prima facie tortious conduct (creation
of the risk), the consequential harm (the matured risk), and a privilege
that has exhausted itself in preventing abatement. This is the privilege
described by Professor Bohlen as "incomplete." 161
A bridge that spans any gap that may exist between the ultrahazardous activities cases and the Vincent case, is found in illustration
3 to the Restatement of Torts, section 197. If an aviator has engine
trouble and is forced to land in a field belonging to another, he is liable
for any actual harm that results. In spite of the risk of harm to the
field, however, he is privileged to make the landing, just as he was
privileged to create a risk in the first instance by putting the plane into
the air." The Restatement deals with this case as being in the Vincent
area, but the illustration would fit as well into the sections dealing with
ultrahazardous activities."
As this illustration helps to point up, no substantial distinction can
be made between the Vincent rule and the ultrahazardous activities
cases on the grounds that the Vincent cases rest upon an intentional
invasion of the property of another by trespass. Certainly a rule as
sound as that in Vincent, resting as it does upon broad considerations
of conflicting social interests, does not need the support of the thin
reed of trespass. When the defendant in Ploof v. Putnam unmoored
the plaintiff's sloop, his concern was not with a threat to his title or
with his exclusive possession. Undoubtedly what bothered him was the
fact that he had gone to a good deal of trouble and expense building a
dock, and here was the plaintiff subjecting it to a risk of harm. In
other words, he was in the same position as the man who doesn't want
an explosives factory next door.' 64 This must be so unless we are
willing to say that the technicality of trespass 1" makes Ploof a "bad"
161. Bohlen, Incomplete Privilege to Inflict Intentional Invasions of Interests of
Property and Personality, 39 HARv. L.Rev. 307 (1926).
162. The Restatement was published in 1939 and took the position that aviation is
an ultrahazardous activity (Section 520, comment b).
163. See note 162 supra. Nuisance and ultrahazardous activities are, as we have
seen, land-use torts. The use of an analogy involving air-use is not for that reason farfetched. The airspace above one's land was, in fact, an element of the rights of property ownership at common law. Cf. Yoffee v. Pennsylvania Power and Light Co., 385
Pa. 520 (1956). Today, "The air is a public highway, as Congress has declared." U. S.
v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1945).
164. The likelihood of harm may (or may not) have been greater in the Ploof and
Vincent cases, but the seriousness of the harm is not even comparable. Risk in any
given case is, of course, the function of the variables of foreseeable likelihood and
foreseeable injury. If the minimum quantum of risk to create negligence is, let us say,
100, negligence can be made out by a foreseeable likelihood valued at 2 and a foreseeable injury valued at 50 (the typical ultrahazardous activities case is of this nature) ;
or by a foreseeable likelihood of 25 and a foreseeable injury of 4 (which may be
descriptive of the Vincent case).
165. In the Vincent case the trespass is all the more artificial and technical, since
the defendant was moored at plaintiff's dock with the latter's permission. To find a
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man (intentionally tortious) and the munitions maker a "good" man
(only negligent).
Of course, the privilege of necessity swallows up a trespass in such
a case. What really troubles us is not whether the safety of Ploof's
family aboard the sloop is for a brief period more important than
Putnam's right to exclusive possession-that is too easy-but whether
Ploof's interest is so important that it justifies knowingly subjecting
Putnam's property to a significant risk of harm. It is this latter question with which the Vincent court was concerned, 6 ' and it is the
resolution of this question that makes the case important. The answer,
of course, is identical with that given in the ultrahazardous cases: Yes,
Ploof's interest is high enough to protect him in maintaining the risk
of harm to Putnam's property; no, Ploof's interest is not high enough
to justify actual harm within the foreseeable risk that he created. 67
Once again, before proceeding to consideration of the atomic
reactor in this common law context of nuisance and ultrahazardous
activities, it might be well to state the definition suggested earlier in
this section:
When a person carries on a land use that creates, in spite of
careful operation, a relatively slight but foreseeable likelihood of severe
injury to another in the use and enjoyment of land, his conduct constitutes, on its face, a nuisance. The other party is entitled to recover
for such physical damage as actually occurs, or he may anticipate the
physical damage by seeking an injunction against the conduct that has
created the risk. However, the defendant may justify the prima facie
nuisance by demonstrating that the social utility served by his conduct
cannot be served otherwise, and that it is of sufficient degree to balance
the risk created. In such a case the defendant may be said to have an
incomplete privilege, i.e., a privilege that is sufficient to protect the
maintenance of the risk, but that is not adequate to justify any physical
damage that actually results within the risk.
trespass, therefore, we would have to rely upon the dubious fiction of trespass ab

initio. See Sz.vEy,

KEMroN,

and

THURSTON,

CASES ON TORTS

47-48 (1950); cf.

MeGuire v. United States, 273 U.S. 95 (1927). Or else we would have to say that
defendant trespassed by adding lines-an equally unsatisfactory sophism.
166. "If while attempting to hold fast to the dock the lines had parted, without
negligence, and the vessel carried against some other boat or dock in the harbor, there
would be no liability upon her owner. But here those in charge of the vessel deliberately
and by their direct efforts held her in such a position that the damage to the dock
resulted, and, having thus preserved the ship at the expense of the dock... her owners
are responsible to the dock owners to the extent of the injury inflicted." Vincent v.
Lake Erie Transportation Co., 109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910). Note, however,
that if the defendant had been out on the lake in the first place through negligence (for
example, with knowledge of the impending storm) he would have been liable if the
ship had been carried out of his control and into another vessel.
167. Note how this forces Ploof to "pay his way" and thereby gauges the value of
his action, just as is said to occur in the ultrahazardous activities cases.
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III. The Atomic Reactor-Hazardsand Utility
The importance of the foregoing discussion of the relationship
between ultrahazardous activities and nuisance, apart from an academic
interest in what the courts are doing, is twofold. First, it indicates
the variety of factors that go into a decision that an activity is ultrahazardous in the technical legal sense. Second, it emphasizes that the
doctrine entails not simply liability for damages, strict or otherwise,
but immunity from injunction.
Under Dean Prosser's statement of the Rylands rule, which defines
in terms of (1) "high degree of risk of harm to others"; (2) "abnormal in the community"; and (3) "inappropriate to its surroundings," 8 he readily decides that no court will be inclined to deny
damages to one injured by escape of radiation.' 6 9 As we have seen,
however, risk, abnormality, and surroundings are only aspects of the
broad question of reasonableness.
We are less concerned here, of course, with whether damages can
be obtained than with whether an injunction will be granted. Dean
Prosser's placing of the reference to radiation in his chapter on Strict
Liabilities implies that in his view an injunction would be denied.
Whether this is so, however, will depend upon our answers to three
broad questions. These are: (1) What is the nature of the risk? (2)
What is the social utility of the activity? and (3) Is the latter great
enough to overcome the former to the extent of precluding injunction?
The related issue in this particular area, whether a state court can
decide these questions at all in view of federal legislation and regulation,
will be considered in the final section of this paper.
First, then, what is the nature of the risk?
As we mentioned earlier, there is an inevitable identification in
the public mind of "atomic" with "bomb." According to our leading
authorities, however, "A reactor can, by no stretch of the imagination,
produce any amount of energy that is at all comparable to an atomic
bomb." 170 The blast effects, for example, even under the worst
circumstances, would be local to the reactor building.'
It is also
reassuring to note that the AEC has operated twenty-five experimental
nuclear-reactors for a total of 606,868 hours without a single accident
168. PROSsER, ToRTs 329 (1955) (black letter, §59).
169. Id., at 336. "The first case involving damage from the escape of radiation
from the use of atomic energy has yet to reach the courts. When it does, it is not
difficult to predict that there is no court which will refuse to apply to it the principle
of strict liability found in the cases which follow Rylands v. Fletcher."
170. Teller, Reactor Safety Considerations,Atomic Energy-The New Industrial

Frontier 75, 76 (1955).
171. Weil, Hazards of Nuclear Power Plants, 121 Sci. 315 (1955).
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involving contamination of off-site property, although several minor

accidents

172

have occurred.' 73

We should bear in mind, however, that these experimental reactor operations, conducted as they are on a relatively small scale and
under immediate government supervision, do not provide conclusive
evidence of reactor safety. The reactors must now be adapted to commercial installations, "where the associated operating hazards are
augmented and the problems of fuel handling and reprocessing, preventive maintenance, and waste disposal and recovery become important cost items and major economic realities." 17' Even if it is true
that research reactors are more susceptible to accidents, the magnitude
of a commercial reactor accident would certainly be greater. 17 5 As the
McKinney Report points out, there have been and will be no substantial reactor hazards until 1958 or 1959, when the first large atomic
power plant will begin to operate. 1 7 The atomic reactor, then, in spite
of the excellent record made by the AEC, is still viewed by knowledgeable people as "a public hazard . . . a great public hazard." 177
One authority explains the danger in terms of the following characteristics of the atomic reactor. First, "the contained radioactive
materials, fission products, and some types of fuel used," create a
"built-in capacity for self-destruction . . . in a fraction of a second." 178 Second, is the fact that "the plant will contain, under certain
circumstances, considerably more fissionable material than the critical
amount." 17 The significance of these two factors can be appreciated
"in some small measure," writes the same authority, "if we compare
the situation with, say, large-scale production of both highly poisonous
gas 'So and explosives under the same roof." 181
172. We will avoid use of the euphemism "incident," which is used in the
literature in the field to describe anything from brief over-exposure to a catastrophe.
173. MURPHY et al., PRELIMINARY REPORT ON FINANCIAL PROTECTION AGAINST
ATOMIC HAZARDS 6, n. 8 (1956).
174. Braidech, The Problem of Insurance in Atomic Energy Developments, 1955
INS. L.J. 743, 746 (1955). The transposition of Salk vaccine production and dispensation from Dr. Salk's laboratory into commercial production and dispensation on a large
scale perhaps provides a rough analogy.
175. Address by Dr. C. Rogers McCullough, Chairman, Advisory Committee on

Reactor Safeguards,

CONVERENCE OP STATE REPRESENTATIVES ON THE AEC LICENSING
PROGRAM 6 (1955). See discussion infra, immediately following.

176. Report of the Panel on the Impact of the Public Uses of Atomic Energy to
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, vol. I, p. 123, 84th Cong. 2d Sess. (1955).
177. Teller, Reactor Safety Considerations,Atomic Energy-The New Industrial
Frontier 75 (1955).
178. Weil, Hazards of Nuclear Power Plants, 121 Sci. 136 (1955).
179. Ibid.
180. "Fission products, which include a large variety of chemical elements, if
inhaled or ingested are from 3 million to 2000 million times more toxic than chlorine,
the most potent industrial poison. . . . In addition, the nuclear fuels themselves,
plutonium and uranium-233; are highly toxic if inhaled or ingested." Weil, supra note
178, at 136.
181. Weil, op. cit. supra note 178.
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Moreover, there are two additional characteristics differentiating
atomic poisons from more conventional industrial poisons: first, they
cannot be detected by the senses, and second, non-lethal exposure can
produce permanent injuries that may not become evident until many
years after the accident." 2 It should be remembered, therefore, that
anyone living in the vicinity of a reactor will be faced with a daily
realization that, even though the reactor appears to be functioning
properly, he may be receiving poisonous doses of radiation. This is so
because among "the many ways" in which radiation accidents occur
are improper shielding, rupture of containers of radioactive materials,
and careless handling."
Of course, the ingenuity of our greatest scientific minds has been
and will be applied to the problem of maximizing safety. The safeguards that have already been devised are impressive and reassuring.
They include "fail-safe" automatic control systems; duplication of
such systems; means to relieve excessive heat; use of chemically inert
materials to minimize chemical reactions between reactor components;
competent supervision of the operation; thorough maintenance and
periodic checkouts; careful location of the reactor; containment of the
reactor to prevent dispersion of poisonous fission products; and expert evaluation of hazard and safeguard reports from prospective
lessees.' 8 4
As reassuring as this may be, however,

".

.

men make mis-

takes and accidents happen." 185 In the often-quoted words of Edward
Teller, "With all the inherent safeguards that can be put into a reactor,
there is still no foolproof system that couldn't be made to work wrongly
by a great enough fool." 18 Illustrative of this truism is the error
that occurred in the May 21, 1956, H-bomb test at Bikini. In spite
of months of "dry runs" over the target area, a bomb with the destructive force of 10 million tons of TNT was dropped four miles off target.
"Human, not technological factors" were blamed for the miss, but an
automatic navigational "brain" in fact compounded the error 187
because a single switch was not thrown. In spite of so-called fail-safe
182. Weil, op. cit. supra note 178. Cf. Spoerl, The Lethal Effects of Radiation in
ATOMIC PowER 139 (1955); Address by Dr. John C. Bugher, Director, Division of
Biology and Medicine, Conference of State Representatives on the AEC Licensing

Program 7 (1955).

183. Report of the Panel on the Impact of the Public Uses of Atomic Energy to
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, vol. I. p. 124, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).

184. McCullough, supra note 175 at 5.
185. Report of the Panel on the Impact of the Public Uses of Atomic Energy to
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, vol. I, p. 124, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1955).
186. Hearings before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Atomic Power Development and Private Enterprise, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. at 632 (1953).

187. N.Y. Times, June 16, 1956, p.l., col.5; Life, June 25, 1956, p.34.
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devices, therefore, it is not purely an academic exercise to consider
the atomic reactor hazard potential at its worst.'
Starting with a 100,000 kw. atomic plant, and emphasizing that
he is, throughout, making the "most pessimistic asumptions," one authority has provided us with a picture of the runaway reactor at its
These most pessimistic assumptions are that the
most destructive.'
radioactive cloud remains close to the ground as it drifts slowly away
from the plant, with a prevailing wind of three to four miles per hour;
that it passes over populated areas; and that an hour after the accident,
a rainstorm arises while the cloud is passing over farm land, drainage
areas that provide the local water supply, and residential and industrial
areas.
The results outside the plant area could be that the people within
a path extending five or six miles from the plant would receive lethal
doses. The harm would be that much greater if the cloud moved, as it
might, along the ground. In addition to the many fatalities, there
would be varying degrees of temporary and permanent injury well beyond the lethal radius. In the rainout area, there would be "widespread serious contamination" of food and water supplies. Evacuation
of residential, business, and industrial areas would be necessitated for
an extended period of time. Finally, "not to be discounted, are the
many individuals who would be obsessed with continuing anxieties
about their fate, even though they had received no observable injury
at the time of the accident." "
In terms of the variables of foreseeable likelihood and foreseeable
severity, therefore, the McKinney Report briefly but adequately summarizes the nature of the risk: "The catastrophe potential inherent in
the atomic industry, although it is remote, is more serious than anything that is now known in any other industry." 191
Atomic hazards should not be discussed only in terms of catastrophe. As the severity of the injury declines, the likelihood of injury
apparently increases substantially. The effects of even relatively slight
doses of radiation poisoning can have serious effects not only upon
the individual but through him upon innumerable descendants. Even
if there is never a reactor explosion, escape of radioactivity from reactor
waste or from inadequate shielding--contingencies perhaps many times
188. A human blunder produced a similar, if less dramatic, accident at an atomic
reactor in Arco, Idaho. N.Y. Times, April 6, 1956, p.12, col. 5.
189. Weil, Hazards of Nuclear Power Plants, 121 SCi. 315 (1955).

190. Ibid.
191. Report of the Panel on the Impact of the Public Uses of Atomic Energy to
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, vol. II, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 599 (1955). Cf.

note 164 supra.
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more likely than that of a runaway reactor-would substantially
shorten the life expectancy of those contaminated and would, in addition, so affect their reproductive cells as to seriously damage their
192
offspring.
We come now to the question, What is the social utility of the
atomic reactor? 193
Sam H. Schurr, Director of the Energy and Mineral Resources
Program of Resources for the Future, Inc., has summarized the findings of the Cowles Commission on the question of the economic practicalities of nuclear power. "Attempts to depict the future of the
'atomic age' have tended to two poles," he writes. At one extreme,
''enthusiasts have pictured a world in which nuclear energy will drive
our cars and round-the-world airplanes, blast aside mountains and
break up icecaps, heat our homes and kill our germs, power our railroads and run our factories, control our weather and transport us to
the moon." "' At the other, "pessimists have asserted that atomic
power will never be practical except for a very limited kind of use."' 95
The Cowles Committee attempted to make a "realistic appraisal
of the economic feasibility of the use of atomic power on the basis of
the present estimated range of costs and present concepts of nuclear
technology." '
The committee's main attention was directed to the
heat-and-electricity generating nuclear fission reactor, and its conclusions, although not unconditionally optimistic, are extremely encouraging. Mr. Schurr makes the following points that are most relevant
to our present concern.
First, in terms of kilowatt-hours per pound of fuel, one pound
of uranium is the equivalent of about 2.5 million pounds, or 1,250 tons
of bituminous coal. The implications of this fact, on consideration of
transportation costs alone, are substantial. The cost of fuel throughout
the world, regardless of distance from the source, could be substantially
equalized. Second, apart from considerations of transportation, the
cost of energy should be considerably lower. Mr. Schurr estimates
that even if the cost of uranium were to increase one hundredfold, to
192. National Academy of Sciences, Genetics Committee Report, Biological Effects
of Atomic Radiation, N.Y. Times, June 13, 1956, p. 18; Muller, Race Poisoning
by Radiation, THE SATURDAY Rvi-w, June 9, 1956, p. 9 .
193. It should be remembered in the discussion in this section that reference to
national interest or pronouncements of federal officials are considered at this point only

as evidence to be weighed by the state court judge, and not as decisions of policy made
binding upon him by federal preemption of the atomic reactor field. Cf. Section IV,
inf!ra.

194. Schurr, The Price Per Kilowatt-Hour, ATOmc PowE 101 (1955).
195. Ibid.
196. Ibid. Any such consideration of the problem is, one should remember, in
long-range terms. At the present time, of course, the atomic reactor is uneconomical.
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$2,000 per pound, it would still be only about one-fourth as costly as
coal per kilowatt-hour. 97
On the basis of these estimates, which admittedly rest on "assumptions which may prove invalid," the conclusion is drawn that reducing
plants located in the iron ore region of northern Minnesota might be
able to deliver iron to the Chicago-Gary market at a lower cost than
the steel plants in that area, and could "almost match" the cost of iron
in the Pittsburgh region.' 9 8
In addition to the illustration from the steel industry, Mr. Schurr
has encouraging words for the production of aluminum, where power
is a substantial cost of production. He states also that for about ten
percent of the national population, nuclear fuels as generators of heat
will be able to compete favorably with conventional fuels in convenience
to user as well as in cost.' 99 Finally, the use of atomic energy will be
especially helpful in those areas of the world, including parts of the
United States, where human resources are not fully utilized. This
would be accomplished by creating new industrial activities and by
counteracting immobility of the labor force to a significant degree with
the increased mobility of the fuel.'
Also to be noted is the importance of peaceful development of the
atom, which has "caught the imagination of the world," 201 as an aspect
of our international program."0 2 Whether for reasons of international
prestige, enlightened self-interest, or simple humanity, we are committed as a nation to world leadership in such a program. In the words
of President Eisenhower, the United States intends to expend every
effort to prove the usefulness of atomic power "to serve the needs
rather than the fears of mankind." 203
197. Schurr, supra note 194, at 102. Relevant to a long-range appraisal is the
further fact that available supplies of fossil fuels are expected to be exhausted in less
than a century. Bhabha, The Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, 11 BULL. AT. Sci. 280,
281 (1955).
198. Schurr, supra note 194, at 107.
199. Schurr, supra note 194 at 109. At the World Power Conference in Vienna
this past summer, John V. Dunworth, head of the Reactor Physics Division of the
British Atomic Energy Authority, announced that atomic power is competitive with
coal. United States delegates commented that the statement must be considered with
regard to the fact that British coal supplies are growing scarce and expensive to mine.
N.Y. Times, June 22, 1956. p. 30, col. 6.
200. Schurr, supra note 194, at 110.
201. The phrase is that of United States physicist Henry DeWolf Smyth, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 30, 1956, p. 28, col. 4.
202. Cf. Thomas, Democratic Control of Atomic Power Development, 21 LAW &
CONTMP. PROB. 38, 41 (1956); Tybout, The Public Investment in Atomic Power
Development, 21 Id., at 60, 84; Wit, Some International Aspects of Atomic Power
Development, 21 Id., at 148, McKinney, The Atom Can Restore Our Prestige Abroad,
N.Y. TIMrs MAo., Aug. 5, 1956, p. 13.
203. Atomic Power for Peace, U. N. G ENRAL ASSEMBLY Om'. Rxc., 8th Sess.,
Plenary 470 (1953), reprinted in Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 7 (1954).
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At the same time, however, it would be misleading to ignore the
position of AEC Chairman Lewis L. Strauss, who holds that technology should precede construction, and that since the nation is not
faced directly with a power crisis, we should not invest exorbitant
sums for power plants that are certain to be not only uneconomical
competitively, but tenchnologically obsolete even before they are completed. However, even Mr. Strauss favors a program of reactor
development by the government in cooperation with private industry,
providing the latter with necessary expertise when full-scale operation
becomes feasible. 4
Turning again to the President, we may summarize the social
utility, or at least, with reasonable optimism, the future social utility,
of the atomic reactor: "The atom stands ready to become man's obedient, tireless servant, if man will only allow it."

205

Finally, Is the promised social utility of the atomic reactor of sufficient weight to preclude an injunction directed against the inherent
hazards ? 206

As for the prima facie tort, the case seems clear. The foreseeable
risk 20 is certainly more than fanciful, nor would a complaint be made
only by one with fastidious sensibilities or on the basis of irrational
fears. Consider, for example, the reluctance of the hardheaded men of
affairs in the insurance industry to make an all-out gamble on an
atomic reactor catastrophe. 20 ' In fact, a court might well take judicial notice of the "generally recognized" magnitude of the hazards to
health and safety created by the use of atomic energy. 2°9
A high degree of social utility has also been made out. Does it
automatically follow that the atomic reactor will be immune to injunction, although subject to damages, either on grounds of strict liability
or in accordance with the analysis of ultrahazardous activities suggested above? I think not, for as we have seen, the total social context must be examined in each particular case.
204. N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1956, p. 8E, col. 3.
205. N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1955, p. 8, col. 4. Quoted in Northrop, The Changing
Role of the Atomic Energy Commission in Atomic Power Development, 21 LAW &
CONTUMP. PROB. 14 (1956).
206. Note again that the question of federal preemption is being postponed.
207. Forseeable risk, without actual harm, is of course enough. "Actual irreparable damage, actual depreciation of property, of course, does not exist. It is the prevention of these consequences which is the objection of the process." Weir's Appeal, 74 Pa.
230, 243 (1873).
208. Cf. Murphy et al., Preliminary Report on Financial Protection Against
Atomic Hazards, N.Y. Times, May 20, 1956, p. 10, col. 2.
209. Report of the Panel on the Impact of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy
to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, vol. II, p. 707, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
Cf. note 83 supra.
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First of all, we are most interested here in anticipation of the
nuisance, i.e., of preventing construction of a reactor in a particular
place.2 1 The first question, therefore, is, how important is location
to the efficiency of the nuclear power reactor.
Apparently it is of great importance. Ideally, from the point of
view of safety alone, the reactor should be located in a remote, unpopulated area.

This, however, would be "clearly .

.

. impractical

An alternative would be to locate
for a nuclear power industry."
the reactor on such a large site that damage to the community would
be minimized. This too raises difficulties: "Since land costs are so
high in industrialized and populated areas, the increase in fixed charges
on the plant could easily price it out of competition." 2
To enjoin location of a reactor on grounds of nearby heavy population, therefore, could in some industrial areas amount to total prohibition. How disposed might a court 2 1 be to bring about such a
result? What weight would be given to the fact that the reactor has
been licensed, with careful consideration given to location, by the AEC
and perhaps the state public utilities commission as well?
According to the weight of authority, an activity authorized by
statute or by administrative order cannot be a public nuisance.214 However, as we mentioned earlier, statutory authority does not extend so
far as to privilege the maintenance of a private nuisance. In such
a case damages, and even in some instances an injunction, will be
granted. 15
Two Supreme Court cases are illustrative of the general rule. In
21

one, Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 21 the defendant operated

a railroad near plaintiff's property. The plaintiff's complaint alleged
injury from dense smoke, dust, dirt, cinders, and vibrations. Part
of this injury was occasioned by the fact that plaintiff's land lay opposite a tunnel ventilator that served to keep the tunnel free of smoke
and gases. In its answer the company defended on the grounds that
210. Cf. p. 89 supra.
211. Weil, Hazards of Nuclear Power Plants, 121 Sci. 315, 316 (1955). Cf. Summary of the address by W. Kenneth Davis, Director, Division of Reactor Development,
CONFERENCE OF STATE REPRESENTATIVES ON THE AEC LICENSING PROGRAM 3 (1955).
212. Weil, Hazards of Nuclear Power Plants, 121 Sci. 315, 316 (1955).
213. Although the discussion will be in terms of court decisions, it should be
remembered that legislatures and public utility commissions will have similar problems.
Cf. The Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission Act, June 24, 1939, P.L. 872 § 656;
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66 § 1183, providing for initial jurisdiction in the Commission to
determine and make necessary orders regarding unsafe public utilities.
214. 39 AM. JuR. Nuisances § 205 (1942). Richards v. Washington Terminal Co.,
233 U.S. 546 (1913). But cf. Northwestern Fertilizer Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659
(1878) ; Yoffee v. Pennsylvania Power and Light Co., 385 Pa. 520 (1956).
215. Baltimore and Potomac R.R. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U.S. 317 (1882).
216. 233 U.S. 546 (1913).
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the construction had been authorized by an act of Congress, permits
had been issued by the Commissioners of the District of Columbia,
and the railroad right of way had been condemned by Congress.
The Court nevertheless held that ".

.

.

while the legislature

may legalize what otherwise would be a public nuisance, it may not
confer immunity from action for a private nuisance of such a character as to amount in effect to a taking of private property for public
use." 217 Since the railroad had no practical alternative to the location
of the tunnel and the blower, an injunction would have been contrary
to the public interest. 21s Even so, the burden placed on the plaintiff
by that part of the injury caused by the blower was "so direct and
peculiar and substantial" 219 that the legislative authority was held
to be no defense to an action for damages. However, no recovery was
allowed for that part of the injury which constituted only "sharing
in the common burden of incidental damages arising from the legalized
nuisance."

2

o

In the other case, Baltimore & Potomac R.R. v. Fifth Baptist
Church, 221 the Supreme Court went even further and allowed an injunction against the maintenance of a railroad engine house and
machine shop adjacent to a church.222 Here too congressional authorization of the route was set up as a defense. However, the Court
found that this authority did not extend to locating an engine house and
machine shop wherever the railroad might see fit, "without reference
to the property rights of others." 22
By way of argument ad absurdum the Court added, "As well
might it have been contended that the act permitted it to place
them

.

.

. in the most densely populated locality."

224

The Court

217. Id., at 553.
218. Cf. 233 U. S. at 557.
219. Id. at 559.
220. 233 U.S. at 554.
221. 108 U.S. 317 (1882).
222. Cf. Judson v. Los Angeles Suburban Gas Co., 157 Cal. 169, 106 Pac. 581
(1910) (gas works enjoined by private citizen) ; Churchill v. Burlington Water Co.,
94 Iowa 89, 62 N.W. 646 (1895).
223. Baltimore & Potomac R.R. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U.S. 317 (1882).
224. Id., at 331. Note that by statutory construction the court would have avoided
having to find statutory authorization of so clear a public nuisance. Cf. Yoffe v.
Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 385 Pa. 520, 535 (1956): "The defendant stresses
the fact that it had obtained license on consent of governmental authorities to span
the river with its wire, but the license did not immunize the company from responsibility
for negligence or for creating a hazard to the public." Similarly, Seaboard Airline R. R
v. The Pan Maryland, 105 F. Supp. 958, 964 (S.D. Ga. 1932). "It is inconceivable that
there could be any basis in law or in fact for Seaboard's contention that once its bridge
was approved by the Secretary of War, it could not constitute a hazard, that, in the
absence of a specific directive from the Secretary of War to alter the bridge, the
Railroad was powerless to initiate any steps toward correcting the extremely hazardous
and unsafe conditions existing at the bridge insofar as navigation was concerned."
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held that regardless of the extent of the authority conferred a qualification prohibiting the establishment of a private nuisance must be inferred.22 "Grants of privilege or powers to corporate bodies, like
those in question, confer no license to use them in disregard of the
,,226 Apparently of considerable imprivate rights of others..
portance to the allowance of the injunction, however, is the fact that
there were "many [other] places in the city .

.

.

sufficiently near

the station of the company to answer its purposes." 227
The Richards and Baptist Church cases are significant for our
purposes for three reasons: first, because they both concede that explicit
legislative authorization precludes a finding of public nuisance; second,
because they are consistent in following the rule that no private party,
except insofar as he can show special injury, can prevent the maintenance of a public nuisance; and third, because the point on which the
grant or denial of injunction turned is the availability of an alternative
location that would equally have served the public purpose.
There can be little doubt that an atomic reactor, assuming that
it is a nuisance, is a public one. There is probably no industrial risk
that creates a hazard shared so generally by so many. Its preclusion
from a community, therefore, unless a private individual is able to make
out a case of special damage, can only be accomplished by legislative
action or by suit initiated by the appropriate executive official.
In such a case, if there is conflict between municipal and state
officials, the state decision is almost certain to prevail. For example,
in Jewish Consumptives Relief Society v. Town of Woodbuy,22 s a
state certificate of approval for a tuberculosis sanatorium in Woodbury
was given, subject to any "valid town ordinance." The town promptly
zoned all sanatoria out of town. The court, in holding the ordinance
ineffective, emphasizes at one point that the ordinance provided not for
segregation of such uses but for "unqualified prohibition." 229 Yet
later in its opinion the court states that because of the specific grant of
power to a state commission to certify approval, which included consideration of location, the city could not even exclude the sanatorium
from its residential zone. 230
Similarly, in the recent Duquesne Light Co. v. Upper St. Clair
Township, 2" the utility was held not subject to a town zoning ordi225. 108 U.S. at 331.
226. Ibid.
227. 108 U.S. at 334. If there had been no other possible location, at least damages
would have been awarded.
228. 243 N.Y.S. 686 (1930)

229. Id. at 693.
230. Id. at 696.
231. 377 Pa.312,105 A.2d 287 (1954).
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nance that might have required rerouting of proposed towers and power
transmission lines. A contrary holding, said the Court, would be inconsistent with the power of the state public utilities commission to
regulate the utility.
State courts also, as a matter of discretion and without consideration of constitutional compulsion to do so, have taken the national
interest into account. The typical case is that of offensive use for purposes of war production. The national emergency has consistently
been a controlling factor in such cases. 2 However, in the absence of
federal preemption of the field, federal licensing of an activity would
not preclude intrastate exercise of state police power. '
A state legislature or court could declare an activity to be a public nuisance in a
given locality, regardless of federal licensing.
More interesting would be a case in which one state sued to enjoin the construction of an atomic reactor close to its own border but
in a sister state. Apart from the question of whether there is a nuisance, to which we will return shortly, there is authority in support of
standing on the part of a state to represent its citizens in this fashion.
In Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 34 for example, gas from the
defendant's plant was ruining forests, orchards and crops in five
Georgia counties."
Justice Holmes wrote the opinion for the Court,
allowing Georgia to enjoin the Tennessee industry. "Whether by
insisting upon this claim [Georgia] is doing more harm than good
to her own citizens is for her to determine." 238
It is not unlikely in any of these cases, however, that private
parties will be able to show special injuries. Property values in the
immediate neighoborhood of a reactor, especially if there should be
even a minor fallout accident, might well go down sharply when plans
to build the reactor get underway.- 7 If so, as we have seen, an injunction might be granted at the suit of a private citizen.
232. King v. Columbian Carbon Co., 152 F.2d 636 (5th Cir. 1945); Stubbins v.
Atlantic City Electric Co., 136N.J. Eq. 327, 41 A.2d 794 (1945); People v. Amecco
Chemicals, 180 Misc. 1014, 43 N.Y.S. 2d 330 (1943). Cf. Ferri v. Wilbur, 27 F. 2d 262
(4th Cir. 1928).
233. Eicholz v. Public Service Commission, 306 U.S. 268 (1938). Cf. Act of June
24, 1939, P.L. 872 § 656 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4656; Act of July 27, 1953, P.L. 641
§§ 1-2 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2. §§ 1458, 1459 (Supp. 1954) (limitation of height of radio
transmission towers near airfields) ; see note 212 supra and Part IV, infra.
234. 206 U.S. 230 (1906).
235. Before suit, Georgia officials tried without success to obtain help from the
state of Tennessee in abating the nuisance.
236. 206 U.S. at 239. Justice Holmes also stated that in suing as a "quasi-sovereign"
Georgia was ". . . somewhat more certainly entitled to specific relief than a private
party might be." Id., at 237. There seems to be no justification for this dictum, and
Justice Harlan, who concurred in result, dissented on this one point. Id., at 239.
237. Of course, things could get so bad that they would be good, from the point of
view of the defense counsel. If property depreciation were widespread enough, it would
not constitute grounds for a private nuisance suit.
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The fact that there might be no alternative site could certainly
provide a stumbling block for the plaintiff. However, the alternativelocation holdings all involve a major premise that may not always hold
in the atomic reactor case-that is, the high social value of the public
utility in question.
Another obvious factor is the irreparable nature of radiation injury. A court might be less disposed to allow the defendant to proceed
"at his own risk" in a reactor case than in one in which the alleged
interference would amount to annoying noise or unpleasant odors.
However, an equitable doctrine that might be available to a defendant
in an appropriate case is laches. If the plaintiff has for an undue length
of time permitted construction of the reactor to proceed without objection, he could be found to have forfeited his right to relief."
To return, then, to our original question, might a court enjoin an
atomic reactor? I think it well might, depending upon the local conditions. As suggested earlier, the utility of a reactor cannot be evaluated in the abstract. The hazards, of course, are substantial. Cheerful
forecasts of cheaper fuel costs cannot in every case overbalance such a
risk.
Certainly in parts of New England the possibility of inexpensive
power is an extremely weighty factor, especially with so much industrial migration to the South. The Massachusetts legislature, for example, has passed a "Resolve Providing for an Investigation and
Study by a Special Committee Relative to Procuring a Steel Mill and
Atomic Plants within the Commonwealth." " In such a social context, the utility might well be considered high enough to justify maintenance of the risk-a typical ultrahazardous activities case.
However, there are other areas of the country where a contrary
result would be indicated by a different economic and social context.
The National Coal Association and various miners' unions have expressed disapproval of government subsidized competition from nuclear fuel, and it has been reported that Congressmen from relatively
fuel-rich Pennsylvania have questioned the location of the Shippingport reactor in that state. 2 °
It would, it is submitted, be entirely proper for a judge in such an
area to weigh the social utility of the atomic reactor in the context of
238. See note 30 supra.
239. Mass. Acts and Resolves 1955, c. 88. Other high-cost power areas, such as
Nevada, are reported receptive to local atomic reactor development. Thomas,Democratic Control of Atomic Power Development, 21 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 38, 53 (1956).
In a recent convention in St. Petersburg, Florida, of 200 technical, industrial and educational leaders, as well as representatives of southern state governments and the AEC,
recommendations were adopted "to create a bold and comprehensive regional action
program for nuclear energy in the South." N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1956, p. 59, col. 1.
240. Thomas, supra note 239 at 53.
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established and healthy industrial and social patterns. Indeed, it would
be bad nuisance law if he did not. In such an area, in view of the high
risk of nuclear power production, the minimal local gain, and the
availability of sites in other areas of the country, an injunction against
erection of an atomic reactor would be entirely appropriate.
IV. Federal Preemption of Reactor Regulation
We turn now from the question of the application of the law of
nuisance, to the question of the power of a state court, in view of the
federal legislation, regulation, and interest in the field, to enjoin the
erection of a reactor. We are not here concerned, however, with
whether Congress has the power to legislate in the area. This has
been adequately covered elsewhere, 24' and will here be assumed. Our
concern will be with whether the courts should infer an intention on
the part of Congress to preclude state regulation of this nature.
At the threshold of this issue is the recent decision of the Supreme
Court in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Nelson.24 2 The Court
there held that the Pennsylvania Sedition Act 2" was rendered invalid
2 44
by force of federal preemption implicit in the Smith Act.

In reaching this decision the Court applied three criteria of federal
preemption: (1) Whether the federal regulation is "so pervasive as
to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the
States to supplement it"; 245 (2) Whether the field is of such a peculiarly national concern, that it can be considered "in no sense a local
enforcement problem"; 246 (3) Whether the state regulation "presents
a serious danger of conflict with the administration of the federal
program." 247
Although these tests overlap to a considerable degree, it is convenient to lay out some of the material bearing on Federal preemption
in the pattern of the Nelson analysis. However, the significance of
other language in that case may be far greater than is the analytical
structure of the opinion. We will therefore return to the Nelson case
at a later point.
241. Estep, Federal Control of Health and Safety Standards in Peacetime Atomic
Energy Activities, 52 MICH. L.R.Ev. 333 (1954). Professor Estep considers the problem
in terms of the power to dispose of government property, the commerce, war, and tax
powers, and the power to provide for the general welfare.

242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

350 U.S. 497 (1956).
Act of March 11, 1864, P.L. 6 § 1, PA. STAr. ANN. tit. 18 § 4207 (1939).
18 U.S.C. §2384 (1953).
Commonwealth v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
Id. at 482.

247. Ibid.
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First, then, to what extent has Congress indicated an intention
to occupy the field ?
As one authority 248 has pointed out, in the 1946 Atomic Energy
Act Congress clearly exercised exclusive control in the atomic energy
area. Not only has there been no modifying language in the 1954 Act,
but there are extensive instructions given to the AEC in this regard
with no explicit recognition of any complementary independent role
for the states.249
Under sections 103 (d) and 104 (d), for example, "no license may
be issued .
a license .

.

.

.

.

if, in the opinion of the Commission, the issuance of
would be inimical to the health and safety of the

public." Sections 161(b) and (f) are even broader. Subsection (b)
authorizes the AEC to "establish by rule, regulation, or order, such
standards and instructions . . . as the Commission may deem
necessary or desirable . . . to protect health or to minimize danger

to life or property." Subsection (f) authorizes the AEC to "utilize or
employ the services or personnel of any Government agency or any
state or local government, or voluntary or uncompensated personnel,
to perform such functions on its behalf as may appear desirable."
The implication seems to be that radiation hazards are the province
of the Commission, and that State and local government activities,
along with those of "voluntary or uncompensated personnel," are to
be limited to assistance to the AEC in the latter's discretion.
The diligence exercised by the AEC in its licensing and inspection
activities is impressive. It includes careful evaluation of proposed uses
as well as "visitation" of users of radioactive materials, for purposes
of judging the adequacy of facilities and equipment, assisting the user
with regard to safety problems, and determining whether a user is
complying with the terms and conditions of his license and with AEC
health and safety standards.2 °
The influence of the AEC, moreover, "has blanketed the whole
realm of atomic energy." 21 The Commission, with direct responsibility for development and control of atomic energy, has been the "overwhelmingly dominant locus of power" in the field, along with the
248. Krebs and Hamilton, The Role of the States in Atomic Development, 21
& CONTEMP. Prob. 182 (1956).
249. Id., at 199. See especially §§ 101-104, and 161(b) and (f). 68 Stat. §§ 936,
937, 948, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2133, 2134, 2201 (1954).
250. See address by Dr. Paul C. Aebersold, Director, Isotopes Division, Oak
Ridge Operations, Conference of State Representatives on the AEC Licensing Program 14 (1955). MARKS and TROWBRIDGE, FRAMEWORK FOR THE AToMIc INDUSTRY
109-119.
251. Northrop, The Changing Role of the Atomic Energy Commission in Atomic
Power Development, 21 LAW & CONTZMP. Prob. 14, 15 (1956).
LAW
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Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.252 In spite of a "trend away from
this unique domination by the federal government," a recent article
devoted to analysis of this trend makes no reference to any contemplated shift of power to the states, but only to the increasing responSimilarly, the McKinney Report states
sibility of private industry. '
that "Federal, State, and local authorities must continue to cooperate
closely" in the interest of "uniform radiation health standards," but
adds:
There must be a balance between the conceivable and the actual
hazards, however, and for some years to come the Federal Government will certainly have the responsibility of estimating this
balance. This is not the sole responsibility of the Commission,
but a joint responsibility of all Federal agencies involved or
affected.2 54
However, the McKinney Report can be cited as well for limited
rather than complete federal occupation. For example, at another point
the Report states:
It would seem unnecessarily cumbersome and expensive to have a
separate Federal agency-the Commission-invade all...
affected industries and regulate, inspect, and enforce. The Commission has already indicated an intention of letting other Federal,
State and local authorities take on the detailed regulation and
enforcement, in those areas and activities which are their normal
province. For example, conferences of State officials have been
held on health and safety and other regulatory problems.
The Federal Government is in a more informed and better
position to establish minimum standards. The responsibility for
adapting these standards to local conditions and enforcing them
could be kept within the purview of the State and local authorities. 5
At one of the conferences referred to in the McKinney Report,
representatives of the AEC who spoke and answered questions from
the floor were most careful to leave the issue of federal occupation open.
An example is the following question, and the response made by Dr.
C. Rogers McCullough, Chairman of the Advisory Committee on
Reactor Safeguards:
252. Ibid.
253. Ibid.
254. Report of the Panel on the Impact of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy
to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, vol. I, p. 128, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
255. Id. at 133.
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Question: Will the AEC license require that a licensee
comply with all applicable State and local regulations?
Answer: The present drafts of the proposed regulations do
not relieve the licensee from compliance with State and local
regulations, but they do not expressly require compliance.256
At the same conference Mrs. Clara Beyer, Associate Director of
the Bureau of Labor Standards, stated that "state agencies should
. step up their safety and health programs and acquire the necessary experience for dealing with radiation hazards." The states, she
said, have a "much broader responsibility" for safety and health than
does the AEC, whose regulations "govern only a part of the problem." 257
Our second test is whether the atomic energy field is of such a
peculiar national concern that it can be considered in no sense a local
problem.
Clearly the international aspects of atomic energy development
is a federal rather than a local concern. As one authority has written,
The Commission must stimulate industrial participation not only
for its own sake, but as a means of achieving competitive power
most swiftly, as required by the need to keep in the forefront of
world atomic development. In this joint operation, coordination
are necessary. This must be the task of the
and harmonization
258
AEC.

A further consideration is that radiation hazards are not local,
but multistate. This fact, too, points to the national, rather than state,
nature of the problem.25 9 Similarly, uniformity of safety and health
A lack of uniformity could, for example,
standards is desirable. 2"
make impracticable the development of a multistate market for manufactured goods in the atomic field." 1
On the other hand, there are some aspects of the atomic energy
program that are so related to local conditions and local problems as
to indicate at least an overlap of local interest with federal. This is
recognized in the above quotation from the McKinney Report that
256. Conference of State Representatives on the AEC Licensing Program 7
(1955).

257. Id., at 21.
258. Northrop, The Changing Role of the Atomic Energy Commission in Atomic
Power Development, 21 LAW & CONTZMP. PROB. 14, 15 (1956).
259. Cf. Krebs and Hamilton, The Role of the States in Atomic Development, 21
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 182, 199 (1956).
260. Ibid.
261. Cf. Address by Dr. Paul C. Aebersold, Conference of State Representatives
on the AEC Licensing Program 18 (1955).
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refers to "those areas and activities that are [the] normal province"
of the states, and that takes specific note of the problem of adapting
minimum federal safety standards to local conditions." 2 Similar
suggestions can be found at several points in the Conference of State
Representatives on the AEC Licensing Program.? a For example,
Harold L. Price, Director of the AEC's Division of Civilian Application
was asked. the following:
Question: Have areas of regulation been defined as between
those which would be exclusively Federal, exclusively State, or
concurrent as to both Federal and State?

Answer: No. AEC's responsibility is to see that licensees
comply with the applicable provisions of the Atomic Energy Act
and the terms and conditions of the license. It is recognized,
however, that the States have an interest also . . .
Third is the question as to whether state regulation presents a
serious conflict with administration of the federal program. Here
again AEC representatives and other authorities in the area suggest
both an affirmative and a negative answer.
With regard to possible stricter safety standards in the states, the
McKinney Panel has stated that "overcautious safety standards applied
without adequate knowledge could be so costly as to deter development
and application." 265 However, even if state and federal regulations
are separate but identical, conflicts in administration and administrative
discretion would be inevitable; the process of licensing atomic facilities
is, of course, a slow and difficult one. In addition, lack of expertise on
the local level would be conducive to conflict.
At the same time, Mr. Price has expressed the hope that the
states will be able to participate in the area of atomic energy regulation
without conflict with federal activities.2 66 The McKinney Report at
one point has gone even further, suggesting that "State and local
bodies have the right to impose regulations more stringent than those
262. See note 255 supra.
263. The very fact that such a conference was held is, as the McKinney Report
points out, a significant recognition of state interest in the local aspects of the problem. See note 255 supra.
264. See note 266 infra.
265. Report of the Panel on the Impact of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy
to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, vol. 1, p. 123, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
Cf. Krebs and Hamilton, The Role of the States in Atomic Development, 21 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 182, 202 (1956).
266. Address, Conference of State Representatives on the AEC Licensing Program 4 (1955).
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required by the Federal Government." 267 Although this statement is
268
perhaps extreme, as well as contradictory of other parts of the Report,
it is at least indicative of the fact that the states have not been excluded
on grounds of potential conflict.
The question that must ultimately be answered here is whether
application of nuisance law to bar the erection of a reactor is within
that area that is (1) outside an exclusive federal field, (2) of primarily
state concern, and (3) not in conflict with federal policy. First, however, let us return briefly to the Nelson case.
As was suggested above, the importance of the Nelson opinion
may lie not in the structure of the analysis but in the facts of the case
and the limitation of the holding to those facts. It should be noted
first that Nelson involved activities designed to overthrow lawful government by force. One can imagine few subjects that come more
clearly within the traditional concept of "police power," i.e., of powers
reserved to the states by the tenth amendment. Secondly, it is of
significance that in the Nelson case the state activity was not antithetical
to the federal policy, but directed toward the same end.
Viewed in this light the decision does seem to go "considerably
beyond existing Supreme Court precedent." " However, Chief Justice
Warren is careful to point out that the decision does not prevent the
state from protecting itself against "sabotage or attempted violence of
all kinds," nor from prosecuting "where the same act constitutes both
a federal and a state offense under the police power." 270
The Court's distinction of the Gilbert case 271 in this context is
significant. In Gilbert the Supreme Court had held valid as "simply
a local police measure," the defendant's conviction under a state statute
prescribing interference with the enlistment of men in the military or
naval service of the United States-clearly a national concern. The
Gilbert case is distinguished, however, on the ground that there the
Court had found an immediate "prompting to violence." 272
267. Report of the Panel on the Impact of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy
to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, vol. I, p. 133, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
268. See note 265 supra.
269. Note, 40 VA. L. Rev. 345, 346 (1954) (commenting on the decision in the
state court, 377 Pa. 58, 104 A.2d 133 (1954)).
270. Commonwealth v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956). Cf. the recent opinion of
Tennessee Attorney General George F. McCanless, N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1956, p. 52,
col. 3. (One John Kasper has been indicted under the state anti-sedition statute for
inciting race riots in his campaign against racial integration in public schools. Mr.
McCanless expressed confidence that the state law is valid insofar as it is applied
to seditious acts against the state alone and to inciting to riots.)
If the state court
should limit the statute to such cases of threat of immediate breach of the peace, the
Nelson decision could be readily distinguished.
271. Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920).
272. Commonwealth v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, n.9 (1956).
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Similarly, Pennsylvania is left now with plenary power over any
"actual or threatened internal civil disturbances." 273 The validity of
the Smith Act is, of course, premised upon threatened internal civil
disturbances. 74 In spite of the analysis in terms of federal occupation
and interest, and possibility of state conflict, therefore, a very substantial
overlap of state and federal jurisdiction remains. The state is precluded
only from dealing with sedition qua sedition.
Turning then to our question of whether a state court can apply
nuisance law to atomic reactors, we can suggest several conclusions on
the basis of the analysis thus far: (1) Although the federal government
has occupied a significant part of the field of atomic development, there
is still a substantial area of health and safety regulation reserved to the
states; (2) Although the national interest as to many aspects of atomic
energy development is clear, considerable state interest in related local
problems of health and safety is also evident; (3) Although state
conflict with the federal policy of speedy atomic reactor development
is probably contrary to congressional intent, the states will be permitted
to regulate local health and safety as such, in spite of some degree of
conflict with the overlapping federal area of atomic energy develop75
ment.1
This conclusion is supported by the McKinney Report reference
to the policy of the AEC favoring "detailed regulation and enforcement" by the state and local government "in those areas and activities
which are their normal province." 27
Certainly the protection of
members of the public from industrial nuisances generally, is within
this category.
It can be argued, however, that the propriety of the location of a
reactor is just one of those things that the AEC has most clearly
preempted through authorized issuance of regulations. The AEC, with
the assistance of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards,
obtains and examines complete data on a proposed site, including
meteorology, earthquake history, geology, hydrology, etc. 2 77 As part
273. Id., at 500, n. 8, quoting with approval from the opinion of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, 377 Pa. 58, 70, 104 A.2d 133, 139 (1954).
274. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
275. No implication is intended that the line will be easy to draw in all cases
between what is local health and safety and what is federal atomic reactor regulation.
The establishment of radiation tolerance figures for reactor personnel would probably
be exclusively a federal function. Waste disposal into public sewers is more difficult
to decide. Cf. Atomic Energy Commission, Notice of Proposed Rule-Making, Standards for Protection Against Radiation, 20 FFD. R. 5101 (1955); Mass. Acts and
Resolves c. 335 (1955).
276. Report of the Panel on the Impact of the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy
to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, vol. I, p. 133, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
277. II Id. at 597.
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of this effort, the AEC requires each applicant for a license to file
complete information describing the proposed site, with a map indicating
the surrounding land use.2
In spite of this fact, however, a court should hesitate to infer that
Congress intended to remove from the jurisdiction of the states all
questions of local, state, or even of regional planning. True, a state
cannot overrule the AEC on reactor safety standards as such. But
neither can the AEC, without clear and explicit authorization from
Congress, usurp all related state power over health and safety.
This is not meant to suggest that a state could use its police power
to exclude atomic reactors from non-populous areas. However, we
must distinguish this abuse of power from the state's right to segregate
this industrial use to the same extent that it would segregate other
similar hazardous industrial uses. In a particular state, New Jersey
or Rhode Island, for example, this could reasonably amount to total
exclusion. In most other states, it would not. A New York court,
for example, should certainly be upheld if it barred a nuclear power
plant from downtown Manhattan,"7 9 whereas it might well be found
to conflict unreasonably with the federal policy if it sought to exclude
the same reactor from less densely populated areas of the state.
Of interest in this regard is the decision of the Belgian government to refuse permission, on grounds of public health, for the
construction of a small demonstrator reactor at the 1958 International
Exposition in that country. A New York Times correspondent
reported that "the Belgians seem to be no more concerned about atomic
radiation than most people," but the operation of even a pilot model
within or bordering the city limits seemed "a needless, even a foolhardy" risk to many residents. 8 ° At the same time, however, Belgium
is moving ahead quickly on her own atomic development program. A
reactor location has been established in the sand and pinewood area of
28
Northern Belgium in Antwerp Province. '

One final point raised by the Nelson case bears mention. Both
the United States Supreme Court and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
stress as a "peculiar danger of interference with the federal program"
278. Atomic Energy Commission, Licensing of Production Facilities, 21 FxD.
RIZG. 355, 357 (1956), amending 10 C.F.R. § 50, 50.34 (1947).
279. Compare the ordinance of Pleasant Hills Borough, Pennsylvania, which
soberly prohibits the testing of atomic bombs within the town limits, in complete disregard of possible conflict with the national interest. PA. ORD. No. 36, 2 ZONING ORD.
bk. 456, art. IX, § 901. Compare the equally sober pronouncement in a recent law
review note, that "undoubtedly, this can be done for the safety of its residents." Note,
16 U. ov PirT. L. Rxv. 168, 179 (1955).
280. N.Y. Times, July 19, 1956, p. 8, col. 1.
281. Ibid.

19571

THE ATOMIC REACTOR

the fact that a private party can initiate court proceedings. 22s
The
same is true, of course, in the case of a private nuisance. The difference
is, however, that in the latter case, the plaintiff is entitled to sue only
because he is personally damaged to a greater degree than any other
member of the community. In such a case, there is more than rational
justification for allowing the suit. As both the Richards " and
Baptist Church 284 cases make clear, the fifth amendment of the Constitution requires that relief be allowed, at least to the extent of just
compensation.
V. Conclusion
Our conclusion is, then, that under the common law of nuisance
and the related doctrine of "abnormal uses" or "ultrahazardous activities," a state court could, in some instances properly enjoin the construction of an atomic reactor. This can be done, however, only after
balancing the nature of the hazards involved against the social utility
of a reactor in the particular location.
Although the state court in such a case should weigh the fact
that a license has been given by the AEC, the license in itself would not
be conclusive on the question of public nuisance. On the other hand,
state legislative or administrative authorization clearly approving the
location would be determinative. The courts, however, might be
reluctant to construe such authorization broadly enough to cover a
clear case of public nuisance, inferring an absence of legislative intent
to bring about such a result. Neither state nor federal license would
be conclusive as to private nuisance.
Federal interest, legislation, and regulation in the field of atomic
energy development would not preclude a state court finding of nuisance.
A state would undoubtedly be restricted from entering directly into the
field of atomic reactor regulation. However, as long as state regulation
affects the federal atomic program in a non-discriminatory fashion, and
only through the exercise of traditional local planning powers as such,
the state regulation should be upheld.
282. 350 U.S. 497 (1956) ; 377 Pa. 58, 74, 104 A.2d 133, 141 (1954).
283. Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546, 557 (1913).
284. Baltimore & Potomac R.R. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U.S. 317 (1882).

